If you’re looking for reviews of Russia blogs, then look no further than BlogWatch.

I’m happy to say that Siberian Light was one of the blogs they reviewed recently, although SL only received 3 stars, out of a possible 5.

I shall clearly have to work harder…!

At last, Russia has a homegrown star to match Borat.

Peter Nalitch’s cheesy pop video “Gitar” has taken the newly launched youtube.ru by storm, notching up more than 350,000 views already.

Seriously - who could resist the charming Nalitch as he croons “Gitarrr, Gitarrr, Gitarrr, jump to my yaguarrr, Gitarrr, Gitarrr Gitarrr, come to my boudoirrr” from the front seat of his cramped Soviet Kopeika car?

Filmed by a friend on a handheld camera at his family’s Dacha just outside of Moscow, Gitar (definitely not Guitar) sat relatively un-noticed on Youtube for several months until it spotted by Russia’s bloggers who couldn’t resist the catchy tune, cheesy lyrics and naked cartoon women scrawled across the screen.

Once they picked up the story Nalitch’s fame, and Gitar’s place in internet history, was assured.

Now Nalitch is becoming a star in the real world, too. The 26 year-old Muscovite played his first professional gig earlier this month in front of a packed house at the Apshu club in Moscow. He earned the princely sum of 30,000 roubles (about $1,200), his first ever professional fee.

But, true to his noble character, Nalitch was more concerned about the fans that couldn’t get into the club:

“I give it four stars, I was upset that it was so packed and not everyone was able to get in, but I think the people who were there had fun.”

So, what next for Nalich? Well, the former architecture student is following in the footsteps of his Bosnian grandfather - an opera singer - and is training as a singer at a Moscow music college. And with a number of other songs ready to go, international fame surely beckons.

Russia managed to avoid being paired again with England inthe 2010 Word Cup draw. Instead, they’ve drawn Germany, another giant of European football, who are likely to provide far tougher opposition than either England, Croatia or Israel.

Former German World Cup winning coach and captain Franz Beckenbauer certainly isn’t all that worried by the Russian threat:

“We have no reason at all to be unhappy about this group. There are more difficult groups and there are easier groups. We’re in the middle somewhere,” he told Premiere television. “Russia will be the most difficult, but they only made it into the Euro finals because of the incompetence of England. I think Russia should be beatable. Without being arrogant, you’d have to say we’re the clear favourite in this group.”

Looking on the bright side, though, the other teams in Russia’s World Cup qualifying group aren’t particularly intimidating, and Russia should be able to comfortably secure second place, and a play-off match against another second place finisher for a place in the World Cup itself.

Here’s the draw for Group 4 in full:

Germany
Russia
Finland
Wales
Azerbaijan
Liechtenstein

England, by the way, have been drawn in a post-Soviet paradise of a group. As well as being drawn against Croatia and Andorra (again), they’ve daunting away trips to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to look forward to.

This Russia Today report is a joke, right?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The International Center for Research on Biofuels and Patents in Zurich has chosen Putin for his alternative fuel initiatives in Russia.

The Swiss organisation says its main goal is to prevent future wars over oil.

The centre proposed Putin for his ideas on developing energies based on nanotechnology. It also praised the President for his efforts to reduce Russia’s reliance on fossil fuels.

Surely?

Got a few sparepennies burning a hole in your pocket?

Then you might want to head on down to London auction house Christie’s next Wednesday - as a part of Russian Art Week, they’re holding an auction of valuable Russian artwork.

Arts, books, silverware and icons worth an estimated $74 million are to go under the hammer, and much of the collection is expected to go to wealthy Russians living in London.

Top billing will be given to the Rothschild Faberge Egg, which is expected to sell for a staggering $12-18 million - a record for a Faberge egg. Made in 1902 for the Rothschild family, it was apparently never publicly documented, and has never been seen before in public. According to auctioneer Anthony Philips, the egg is also one of the most unique of Karl Faberge’s eggs:

“There are only two other known Faberge eggs that have a clock in them and also an automaton. When the clock strikes the cock come up, shakes its wings and sings.”

You can see a video of the egg here - I recommend holding out for the end of the video, where the clock is displayed in action.

For more on the history of this beautiful egg, visit Artnow Online.

Well, well. After Russia slipped up in Israel, we all thought it was over. Surely there was no way England could slip up in their last game against Croatia, no hope left for a demoralised Russia.

After all, England were playing at Wembley, their newly refurbished spiritual home, and they only needed to a draw to secure qualification for Euro 2008.

Shame Croatia didn’t read the script. They stomped all over a woeful England on their home turf, winning 3-2 and condemning Steve McLaren’s men to a summer of watching footie on the telly, and McLaren himself to a summer of soul-searching and job hunting.

I’d like to praise the inspired way that Russia won their last game in Andorra (a must win game for Russia at the time). Sadly though, the mighty Russian team didn’t really turn up last night either, only managing to scrape a 1-0 win against Andorra, the group’s whipping boys.

Russia, it has to be said, booked their place in the finals pretty much by default. On last night’s performances, neither England nor Russia deserved a spot in the finals. And a team that can only scrape past Andorra doesn’t really deserve to be in the finals - certainly not when there are quality teams like - um - Israel out there, who were unbeaten in their qualifying matches against Russia.

Kudos to Andorra, though, 0-1 was by far their best result of the tournament.

Can you tell I’m an Englishman, by the way? And that I’m a little bit bitter?

Still, I can’t complain too much. While my compatriots are morosely watching the England-less Euro 2008 finals, I’ll at least be able to support my second team!

Go Russia!

With just a couple of weeks to go until Russia’s parliamentary elections on 2nd December, it’s looking increasingly as though United Russia are set for a massive victory.

However, depressingly, only two of the ‘major’ parties are likely to scrape together the seven percent of votes needed to gain any seats in the Duma - United Russia, and Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Based on a Lenta poll, the next Russian Duma will look something like this:

If the pollsters are correct, United Russia will have 371 Duma seats, the Communist Party a mere 79.

On the face of it, great news for United Russia. Only one opponent to worry about, and majority of substantially more than two-thirds. But it appears as though the Kremlin is beginning to worry athat United Russia may actually be too dominant…

Media coverage of other parties seems to be increasing (albiet only slightly) and there are some early indications that a couple of the other parties - most likely the loony LDPR and the slightly dull Just Russia - might just manage to scrape together enough votes to clamber over the magical 7% mark.

Why?

Well, some would say it’s because a Duma dominated by only one party just wouldn’t look good - either at home or abroad. Putin’s image is at stake.

But I prefer this explanation from Argumenty Nedeli:

Rumor has it that the CPRF might arrange a political scandal with a demostrative walkout from the Duma. That would leave the Duma unable to function, since the law requires the Russian parliament to have at least two parties.

Translation by Elena Leonova for Johnson’s Russia List 2007 #239

Not that would put a dent in Putin’s image. Can you imagine how embarrassing it would be for Putin if he was forced to run another election just because he was too damn popular…

(Note: The figures used to construct these graphs came from a Levada poll carried out last week. The levada.ru website is currently down, though, so I’ve used a link to a news story for the time being).

Americans might well be evil, says Yuri Baluyevsky, Russia’s top General, but it ain’t Russia’s job to save the world!

“Today, there is no need to be afraid of the Russian Armed Forces. However, I do not believe that the Russian military is obliged to defend the world from the evil Americans”.

Probably just as well. Evil George Bush doesn’t think much of the Russian military:

I really don’t view Russia as a threat, a military threat. I don’t think — I’m pretty confident President Putin does not want to have any military conflict.

And he’s spot on in his assessment of Russia’s view of its role in the world…

Israel beat Russia 2-1 on Saturday, a result which leaves Russia’s hopes of qualifying for football’s Euro 2008 hanging by a slender thread and proves comprehensively that Israel are the most honest team in European football.

Russia had gone into the game with high hopes of sealing qualification, thanks to a stunning 2-1 home victory over rivals England last month, but defeat this weekend means that Russia can only pray that Engand lose their final match against Croatia on Wednesday.

The result proved a shock to many pundits, especially those anti-Russian doom-mongers in the British sporting press who had spent the past few weeks merrily circulating rumours that the Israel team had suspiciously close ties to Russia, and were bound to throw the game. Implied, but never quite claimed outright, was that Russian would bribe the Israel team to ensure the right result.

However, as the London Times was quite happy to acknowledge yesterday, the rumour mill actually proved an inspiration to Israel, prompting the Times to dole out some patronising praise and to cheekily claim some of the credit for Israel’s victory:

It was an inconsistent performance from an inexperienced Israel team - the same could be said of Russia – but it was commendable how the home side fought to the end. They were spurred, undoubtedly, by the speculation in the English media that they would roll over; by the talk that they were far too chummy with Russia. Glad to be of assistance, Steve.

I particularly liked the way that corruption allegations have been rephrased as “talk that they were far too chummy with Russia.” But, who was doing the talking? Would you ever guess from the above report that it was the Times themselves who reported the claims Israel would throw the Russia game?

However, so keen were Israel to prove their innocence, they not only went on to win the game, but have refused some massive prizes, including a Mercedes car offered to goalscorer Omer Golan promised by an internet betting site. The Telegraph reports:

“A Mercedes would be nice, a present for my dad,” he said. The Israeli Football Association, however, stated that Golan would not be able to accept the gift because it was deemed to be “beyond the bounds of sportsmanship”.

“Only the Israel FA can give incentives to the players. Certainly they cannot be given by any interested third party and obviously this applies when the offer comes from a fan of a team which has a direct interest in the result,” they said in a statement.

To give you an idea of the relative value of the Mercedes to Golan: his salary is approximately $200,000 per year - the car is worth $100,000.

Review by Michael Averko

The thought of a re-ignited Cold War can send a chill down some people’s spines. “The New Cold War” (Carroll & Graf, New York, 2007) is about a different kind of Cold War. It’s primarily about Western lobbying efforts to establish influence in the former Communist bloc and Russia’s opposition to it. The book’s secondary theme deals with the pipeline politics involving the former Soviet Union and the West. Blended in are some personal accounts by author Mark MacKinnon. His prose is crisp and easy to follow.

The book starts off with a “Dramatis Personae” section, providing a brief description of the involved lead players and organizations. In that segment, issue can be taken with the characterization of Vojislav Kostunica as a “previously anonymous lawyer, who Madeleine Albright convinced the Serbs to rally around” (a point contradicted by Doug Schoen on page 48 of chapter 3). Albright was never in such a position to influence Serb public opinion. Among Serbs, she has been generally viewed as having a bias against them. If anything, Albright championed Zoran Djindjic, who isn’t mentioned in the Dramatis Personae segment. As per my numerous Serb contacts in Serbia and elsewhere, as well as my own research of the man, Kostunica was relatively well known in Serbia before his democratic challenge to Slobodan Milosevic. This prior knowledge of him includes academics outside of Serbia, who study that country. Before Milosevic’s political fall, Kostunica’s accomplishments include his translation of the “Federalist Papers” into Serbian.

On Milosevic’s demise, MacKinnon pays great homage to the role Western (particularly American) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played. He later on (in the book) follows their influence in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. His book emphasizes the Western NGO favorites among Serbs. In Serbia, the George Soros supported Otpor leader Marko Markovic has never come close to matching the popularity of Kostunica or Djindjic. Unlike Djindjic, Markovic is referenced in the Dramatis Personae section. When compared to Kostunica and Djindjic, much attention is spent on the half-Croat/half-Serb Markovic (he’s described as such in the book), who acknowledges (page 46) not being opposed to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, unlike a good number of his Otpor peers and the overwhelming majority of Serbs. Markovic’s popularity with Soros funded NGOs and unpopularity with most Serbs is one of several examples putting into question the enthusiasm of certain Western activity in some areas of the former Communist bloc. For a brief period, the Serbs and Western organizations involved with Serbia had an alliance opposing Milosevic. The post-Milosevic era has seen a decline in that cooperative spirit.

The book’s concentration is on the former USSR and not former Yugoslavia. However, the understanding of smaller nations related to Russia-West relations can be quite pivotal. Getting Kostunica right leads to the contentious Russia-West row over the disputed south Serb province of Kosovo. With a good deal of Serb support, Prime Minister Kostunica and Russia are going against Western efforts to see Kosovo become independent. The issue of Kosovo relates to other disputed former Communist bloc territories. MacKinnon stays off this topic. One which can be very critical when reviewing trouble spots on Russia-West issues.

It’s not easy for an American journalist to do an even handed accounting of the disputed former Communist bloc territories. Make no mistake about how the American mass media establishment prefers Kosovo to be spun. In its reporting and op-ed section, The New York Times (”the paper of record”) makes clear that Kosovo should be independent and that Russia is being hypocritical on the matter of disputed former Communist bloc territories. On this issue, The NYT reflects what most of the leading American foreign policy politicos desire (particularly Democrats, minus Brad Sherman and a few others). The NYT seems to periodically set the tone with how some other American newspapers cover a topic like the disputed former Communist bloc territories.

Canada sees itself as both independent of and a friend of the US. MacKinnon is a Canadian journalist, who writes in his nation’s market. Considering his Canadian standing, I think that he could’ve covered the disputed Communist bloc territories issue in detail. On Kosovo and other former Yugoslav issues, Canada has some progressive souls in journalist Scott Taylor, retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie and former Ambassador James Bissett - a retort to Roger Cohen’s comment about Roy Gutman and Christiane Amanpour. Peter Brock’s book “Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting” provides great insight on the faulty coverage of former Yugoslavia.

Pages 2-3 of the Prologue describe a series of apartment bombings as the pretext for the launching of the second Chechen war of the last decade. No mention is made of Chechen separatist incursions into Dagestan (a Russian republic bordering Chechnya). Incidents which were evident in the lead up to the second Chechen war.

In chapter 1, there’s the briefly stated view that Russian media has become restricted during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This issue has seen its share of debate with several valid points: Russians continue to have a wide range of access to different political views, Russian media during Yeltsin’s presidency wasn’t perfect, Anglo-American mass media is far from perfect.

In the same chapter, the reference to symbols seems to suggest a Soviet like turn in Russia. Mention is made of some issued non-currency commemorative coins honoring Joseph Stalin, the return of the Red Star and Soviet era anthem. For clarity sake, it would’ve been nice to see further elaboration on these references. There’s no great effort to rehabilitate Stalin in Russia. Russian society has become far removed from Stalin’s totalitarian mindset. Adulation for Stalin isn’t widely evident at the annual May 9, Victory Day holiday, commemorating the defeat of Nazism. American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged this after attending the 65th anniversary of the event in 2005. In the present, Benito Mussolini has a following in Italy. Overall, there doesn’t seem to be a great concern of Italy returning to Fascism and there’s no valid reason for fearing a Soviet relapse in Russia. A Russian friend forwarded to me a news clip with this note on October 25: “The Memorial Foundation is conducting a vigil on October 29th, at the Lubyanka Square (where the old KGB was located) in Moscow to commemorate the victims of Stalin’s repression. About 2.6 million names will be read by volunteers. Today, there’re over 500 memorials in Russia to honor the victims of Stalin’s reign of terror.” There’re other examples which contradict the belief of a relatively popular Russian affection of Stalin. Anti-Stalin/pro-Putin advocates include Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nikita Mikhalkov, the dearly departed Mstislav Rostropovich and Paul Klebnikov. Legendary Soviet ice hockey men’s coach Viktor Tikhonov flopped when he returned to coach the post-Soviet Russian national team. It’s no secret that his totalitarian manner was rebuffed by the current generation of Russian ice hockey players. Russia’s recently crowned European men’s championship basketball team was coached by American-Israeli David Blatt. A Stalinist return to Russia isn’t on the horizon. Albeit limited, admiration for Stalin can be found in his native Georgia. Noting any popularity of Stalin in Georgia is problematical in some circles because Georgia is supposedly ahead of Russia in democratic development (more on this in a bit). During Putin’s presidency, the pre-revolutionary Russian Two Headed Eagle has become more utilized. In comparison, the Red Star’s return is considerably limited and its definition has been changed to a non-Communist one. The return of the Soviet anthem is greatly influenced by its stirring appeal over the comparatively drab Yeltsin era Russian anthem. Note that the re-instituted Soviet anthem has words praising pre-revolutionary Russian symbols. Post-Soviet Russia is seeking to establish its present and future by merging the positive aspects from its Imperial and Soviet eras.

When describing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s poor command of the Belarusian language (page 62 of chapter 4), it’s not mentioned that this is true of many Belarusians, who willingly converse in Russian and identify with the Russian Orthodox Church. This contrasts with Ukraine, where there’re many Ukrainian speakers and a good sized Ukrainian Orthodox Church, independent of the Russian Orthodox Church (keeping in mind that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate remains the largest church in Ukraine). When comparing Ukraine and Belarus, the lack of popularity for the Belarusian language and an independent Belarusian Orthodox Church corresponds to why Wales is less nationalistic than Scotland. Somewhat different histories play a key role.

MacKinnon does a good job presenting the politics and history of Ukraine. One can dispute his description of why Viktor Yushchenko was sacked as prime minister by then President Leonid Kuchma (page 81 of chapter 5). MacKinnon portrays it as the work of Moscow, which (as stated by MacKinnon) didn’t like Yushchenko’s blocking “a series of takeovers of Ukrainian companies by Russian firms.” In the lead up to Yushchenko’s firing, then Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Yushchenko sparred with influential leaders in the Ukrainian (not Russian) mining and gas sectors. The dispute came to a head in a 2001 no confidence vote by the Rada (parliament). The vote passed 263 to 69, resulting in Yushchenko’s removal from office. At the time, firing Yushchenko served as good public relations for Kuchma. Since the Soviet breakup, Ukrainian politics has seen shifting geopolitical moods among the leading Ukrainian politicians of this short lived period. Yushchenko is no exception. As prime minister, he approved a number of Russian business acquisitions. This point was stated by some pro-Yushchenko supporters in an effort to win the “Russian vote” during the 2004 presidential election.

In chapter 9, MacKinnon notes how Russian support for Viktor Yanukovych came after American NGOs started backing Yushchenko. That chapter ends with a discussion between MacKinnon and Russian political adviser Vyacheslav Nikhonov on who would win the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. MacKinnon cites Nikonov saying that Yushchenko wouldn’t win despite polls claiming differently.

Chapters 10 and 11 have among the fairest of North American mass media commentary to be found about the so called “Orange Revolution.” Western pro-Yushchenko and Russian pro-Yanukovych election observers each had biases clouding their respective claims. A Yanukovych aide expresses the view (page 170) that the advice of Russian “spin doctors” like Gleb Pavlovsky was counterproductive to Yanukovych’s presidential bid. In turn, the Russian spinsters are quoted (page 175) for believing that Yanukovych’s prison record made him a tough sell. Mackinnon sympathizes with this view and references hyperbolic anti-Orange remarks made by Yanukovych’s wife. On the other hand, Yanukovych’s prison record could be marketed as an example of someone resurrecting himself. The book doesn’t mention the negative past of Yushchenko and his wife. As prime minister, Yushchenko signed a statement calling protestors of beheaded Georgian-Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze “Fascists.” Yushchenko’s wife made insensitive remarks when she belonged to an anti-Russian organization. Two contributing factors relate to Yanukovych’s political comeback after the so called “Orange Revolution”: he’s not so negative as some make him out to be and the Orange side has its own shortcomings. MacKinnon correctly views Western support for Yushchenko as being more effectively implemented to the Russian assistance given to Yanukovych.

MacKinnon’s chapters on Ukraine end in the early part of 2005. Yanukovych’s 2006 political comeback to the role of prime minister came after he hired an American public relations firm. As MacKinnon suggests (page 176), the Russian spin doctors’ role during the so called “Orange Revolution” left something to be desired. I recall one of them providing commentary for a News World International (NWI) feature on Ukraine, shortly after Yushchenko’s presidential inauguration (now defunct, NWI was a Canadian Broadcasting Company television affiliate). When asked why the Orange government was counterproductive, Sergei Markov said that its Russia unfriendly elements served to provoke a nationalist backlash in Russia. From a Russian vantage point, this wasn’t good public relations, in addition to not offering the most accurate of thoughts on the subject. Markov’s emphasis on Russia conjures up the image of a Russian not concerned with how Ukraine feels and provides fodder for the faulty notion of Russia being collectively ripe with overly aggressive nationalists. The better answer to the NWI question would note that the newly inaugurated (at the time) Orange government’s not so Russia friendly members are an anathema to many in Ukraine, who don’t view Russia with hostility. This in turn could create instability within Ukraine, which in the long run wouldn’t benefit anyone. In any event, present day Ukraine is politically murky, with Russia and the West now taking a more hands off approach on that former Soviet republic.

The chapter 6 commentary about Georgia highlights the differences between Moscow and Tbilisi, without noting the examples of willing togetherness. In 1801, Georgia sought to become part of the Russian Empire. Russia has its share of prominent Russian citizens with Georgian surnames. On page 109, MacKinnon uncritically quotes Eduard Shevardnadze’s otherwise dubious belief that Georgia “enjoyed a more dynamic democracy than Putin’s Russia.” This is supported with an uncritically referenced cite from the politicized Freedom House. There’re examples showing that if anything, the reverse is true: Russia appears more democratic than Georgia. The first post-Soviet Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was an authoritarian nationalist. How was he more democratic than Russia’s first post-Soviet president Boris Yeltsin? Shevardnadze, the second post-Soviet Georgian president fell out of favor for being associated with an undemocratically run corrupt environment. In 2003, the current Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili won an election with a Soviet like 96% tally. His governance has exhibited instances showing a less than democratically inclined state. This past September, former Saakashvili ally Irakli Okruashvili was arrested by the Georgian government. Okruashvili is no angel and his less than angelic demeanor was evident when he was allied to Saakashvili. In comparison, there’s outrage when the Russian government arrests a dubious figure of high standing. Of recent note, are the high profile protests against Saakashvili in Georgia. This has been interpreted as Georgia having an open society. There’s also the view that Russia under Putin has been comparatively more stable than Georgia.

The book’s take on Georgia matches the way it portrays George Soros, the billionaire involved with neo-liberal and neo-conservative political activity in the former Communist bloc (on former Communist bloc issues, the neo-conservatives and neo-liberals like Soros tend to agree with each other). Laura Silber, a Soros employed advocate offers the view of a caring philanthropist favoring the little guy (page 111). Soros’ detractors (whose views of him aren’t really mentioned in the book) stress the image of a wealthy billionaire seeking to get into markets (like Russia) where his views aren’t so welcome. Georgia and the Kosovo Albanians serve as a kind of base for Soros. A point that doesn’t appear so disagreeable with many pro and anti-Soros observers. Therein lies the reason why Soros is unsympathetic to patriotically mainstream Serb views, but sympathetic to the anti-Serb nationalism evident among a good number of Albanians and Bosnian Muslims. This matches how he unsympathetically treats patriotically mainstream Russian views versus his comparatively kid gloves approach to the Russia unfriendly nationalism exhibited in parts of the former Communist bloc. Is Soros more democratically inclined than Putin? The latter has won two multi-party presidential elections and is highly regarded by his nation’s population. The former prefers the Kosovo Albanian leaders over a noticeably more democratic and multi-ethnic tolerant Serb leadership. On several issues, Soros funded organizations like the Open Society Institute and International Crisis Group are very one sided in their utilization of sources.

On the book jacket, Lawrence Martin says that MacKinnon’s book is a wakeup call to an ongoing Russia-West squabble. There’re reasons for not being so alarmist. Post-Soviet Russia has been tame. It waited at least a couple of years from when it had a reasonable basis (as far as reasons for waging war go) to wage its first war in Chechnya. The vulgar aspects of the two post-Soviet Chechen wars stem from Russia having a weakened and not always so well disciplined armed forces, combined with the brutish manner of some of the Chechen insurgents. Russia’s need to have a relatively strong conventional armed forces has been acknowledged by some Western analysts. Russia is situated in problematical neighborhoods. It’s way too simplistic to portray Russia as the bully. Tatarstan, a predominately Muslim Russian republic enjoys a good deal of autonomy. Russia’s somewhat clumsy involvement with the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was in reply to the intervention undertaken by Western NGOs. As for the accusation of Russia using its economy as a political tool: the US has a decades long embargo against Cuba and the European Union (EU) hints that Serb membership in the EU is linked to Serbia giving up Kosovo. Big powers carry on in this manner. There’s nothing particularly special about Russia’s purported use of using its economy for political reasons. The West and Russia have curtailed political competition in Ukraine. A pro-Russian business lobby exists with some Western corporations eager to embrace the Russian market. Former American National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski sees Russia eventually moving to the West out of a future fear of China. Another school of thought sees the significant peace time global interrelationship among the current major powers as a deterrent against a World War III/Cold War type setting.

I recommend “The New Cold War” with a few thoughts in mind. It’s a good exercise for all of us to actively engage views we find disagreeable. This shouldn’t be confused with talking over those views in a way that doesn’t fully address them. While bucking some of the conventional English language mass media stances, the book generally expresses how many influential non-Russian observers view the former Communist bloc. Like it or not, that’s a reality which should be addressed; along with how North American mass media at large doesn’t always practice what it preaches in its critiques of Russian media.

******

Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. His commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson’s Russia List, Reuters, Russia Blog, Serbianna, The New York Times and The Tiraspol Times.

There are a few, relatively low key stories in the British papers today about the ‘capture’ of a Russian spy in England, but it’s a bit of an odd story.

Peter Hill, the 23 year old ex Territorial Army soldier suspected of spying, appeared in court in Leeds today. He was arrested under the Official Secrets Act but, rather oddly, he’s being tried under the Explosive Substances Act, for possession of ingredients to make a bomb. Nobody seems quite sure what those ingredients are though - The Times claim a search of Hill’s house revealed “sodium chlorate, hexamine tablets and a metal tube” but the more local Burnley Citizen say that police found “weed killer, nail varnish, sugar and a metal tube”.

From the press reports, it is seeming less and less like this is a major breakthrough by MI5 - more the arrest of a bumbling British fantasist and wannabe spy. The Times reports:

The inquiry is not focusing on an elaborate plot by the Russians, but is being viewed as a suspected attempt by an individual to contact the Russian intelligence service on an “opportunistic” basis.

A theory given further credence by this series of interviews by friends and neighbours of Hill:

“He was in the TA and he was always interested in the army, but for the last couple of years he’s been working for a mortgage company in Skipton.

“He’s the kind of person who is always doing one crazy thing one day and then he’s got his heart set on something else just as weird the next.

“He has always been a bit of a fantasist, and definitely one on his own, but he has friends - there’s no way he’s a loner.”

Of course, if you’re a conspiracy theorist, this could all be an elaborate smokescreen - particularly as all this takes place at the same time as Russia honours British double agent George Blake.

Perhaps the British authorities are trying to insinuate that all Russian spies are actually bumbling fools…

Global Voices Online have just announced that they are accepting proposals for citizen outreach projects. Micro-grants of up to $5,000 are available to support the successful bids.

Ideal applicants will present innovative and detailed proposals to teach citizen media techniques to communities that are poorly positioned to discover and take advantage of tools like blogging, video-blogging, and podcasting on their own.

Full details of how to apply for a microgrant are available on the Global Voices website.

Hooray for Siberian Light, which is currently sitting pretty at number 5 in Krusenstern’s Top 100 Russia Blogs list.

As always, it’s nice to be one of the top blogs about Russia, but because of the difficulty in estimating each blog’s traffic, it’s (sadly for me!) probably not all that accurate. I expect that, if accurate traffic figures were available for all the blogs on the list, Siberian Light would probably slip a few places down the rankings.

The list is, however, an excellent resource if you want to take a look around the Russian blogs that are out there. There are plenty of blogs on the list that I didn’t know about, plus a couple that I didn’t realise were still active.

Russia is brilliantly playing divide and conquer with European Union nations, argues a new paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations.

In “A Power Audit of EU - Russia Relations“, authors Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu provide a sharp analysis of exactly how the nimble Russian bear - which on almost every objective measure of soft and hard power is massively inferior to the EU - has been able to run rings around the lumbering herd of elephants that is the 21st century European Union.

Russia has achieved this success, they argue, because it has managed to identify and manipulate the divisions between EU members states who have wildly varying views on how to deal with Russia.

However, instead of arguing that the EU has been split broadly into two camps by the arrival of new but rabidly anti-Russian members such as Poland in the East, Leonard & Popescu argue that, when it comes to relations with Russia, EU members can be divided into five distinct groups:

‘Trojan Horses’ (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions;

‘Strategic Partners’ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies;

‘Friendly Pragmatists’ (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals;

‘Frosty Pragmatists’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues;

and ‘New Cold Warriors’ (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.

I hadn’t considered EU divisions over Russia in quite that way before, but now I think about it, I tend to agree with these groupings (although ‘Trojan Horse’ is perhaps a bit too strong a term). And the ultimate assessment that Russia has taken advantage of the EU’s structural weakness as best as it could is pretty much spot on, too. The Russian government has invested a massive amount of political capital in wooing those countries it thinks it can do business with, and has been prepared to play hardball (when it can) with those countries who are less friendly to the current Russian regime.

Having said that, Russia isn’t the only country that has noticed and exploited the European Union’s fabled lack of unity. The US is an expert in the game, and regularly takes advantage of its relationships with the UK, Holland and Poland, to name but a few countries. That the Bush admnistration managed to persuade half of the EU’s countries to provide military support in Iraq while EU public opinion was deeply divided on the Iraq War is clear testament to the skill of the US here, as well as to the underlying systemic weakness in the EU’s approach to foreign policy.

The Russian bear should beware when baiting the EU’s herd of elephants, though. The EU does find it tremendously difficult to agree on a common position, but when it does agree on something, the EU has the political muscle to match and defeat any country in the world - witness the recent negotiations over trade between the EU and US.

If the Russian bear overplays its hand and pushes the EU that little bit too far, it might just find itself looking up one day to find a herd of elephants thundering towards it…

Update: Check out Johsha’s post over at Registan.net, discussing some of the implications for Central Asia.

Sometimes I wonder what inspires people to set up new blogs. Take Executed Today, for example, a brilliantly executed (sorry - couldn’t resist) blog about historical executions.

But, sometimes I think it’s just best to accept that what seems like the craziest idea at the time is actually just the most inspired idea, as Executed Today is an excellent blog that does exactly what it says on the tin.

As you’d guess, a fair few people have been executed in Russia / the Soviet Union over time - sometimes fairly, more often not - and there are two Russia-related entries on Executed Today this week alone.

On 5 November 1925, Sidney Reilley, thought by many to have been the inspiration for James Bond, was shot in a forest outside Moscow, accused of attempting to overthrow the Soviet government.

Reilly was lured back to the USSR in 1925 by the Soviet counterintelligence project Operation Trust. Intending to meet anti-Bolshevik agitators, he was instead arrested at the border and tortured at the infamous Lubyanka Prison, where he kept notes on cigarette papers about enemy interrogation techniques for the eventuality of an escape or release that never came.

And, 63 years ago, on the anniversary of the October Revolution, two of Stalin’s greatest spies were hanged in Japan - Richard Sorge and Hotsumi Ozaki:

The two, along with several other Japanese and foreign collaborators, produced a steady diet of top-shelf intelligence, including the (ignored) forecast of Operation Barbarossa. But the ring’s most important coup — arguably a decisive one in the history of the war as a whole — was to inform Moscow in September 1941 that Japan did not intend to attack the Russian Far East. Relieved of the nightmare prospect of a two-front war, Stalin transfered desperately needed Siberian divisions to help throw back the German advance on Moscow.

Executed Today is a fascinating blog - a historical trove, rather than a gory thrill seekers paradise - and is sure to become the authority blog in the executions niche…