Aleksei Ostrovsky, head of the Duma’s Committee for CIS Affairs has recommended that the Russian Government create diplomatic missions at the territories of three unrecognized republics – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dneister (Pridnestrovie).
According to Interfax, the document, which has been prepared for discussion and further confirmation in the Duma, recommends that Russia work to “achieve representatives’ participation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Pridnestrovie in all international organizations and forums, where their interests are discussed and touched.”
Also it was recommended that Russia should “resist firmly any attempts of external pressure – political, economical or military - concerning these three republics” and that the Russian Parliament suggest to the Russian Federation government that it“maintain existing forms of peacekeeping operations to settle conflicts around Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Pridnestrovie based on mutual conventions”.
According to the report:
“Nowadays the situation in the zone of Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia conflicts becomes more and more complicated. Politics realized by Tbilisi is extravagant, unpredictable and sometimes destructive. Georgia is trying to break existing algorithims of conflict settlement and compromise the Russian peacekeepers’ mission. This gives a reason to Abkhazians and Ossetians to believe that Georgian administration chooses military option”.
The report’s authors note that mandate of peacekeeping forces, which are operating in the territory of the conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and Ossetia, only allows them to “split the rivals, maintain regime of security and stop the fire”. To change this mandate would require the agreement of all sides. But neither Abkhazia, nor South Osetia have given their agreement, because they are afraid the departure of Russian peacekeepers would lead to destabilization of the situation in the region.
The authors of the project believe that the precedent set in Kosovo, wich recently declared its independence will have consequences for other “frozen conflicts.” If these conflicts remain “frozen,” this will be provoke new stage of confrontation between conflict sides. And this confrontation will be negative for the population.
Nugzar Ashuba, the head of Parliament of Abkhazia, speaking in the Duma, asked Russia to recognize independence of this self-proclaimed republic as soon as possible. He told Duma members that:
“The Russian Federation now (after the Kosovo incident) has enough reasons to declare the independence of Abkhazia all over the world. By doing this Russia will establish its international weight.”
Ashuba also mentioned that the Georgian government must be interested in recognition new status of republic, because Abkhazia has proved that it was able to survive as an independent entity.
“We think that if Georgia recognizes independence of Abkhazia, its government will solve many other socio-economical problems and the Georgian people will be free from waiting for war every moment.”
The rest of the Duma’s discussion was closed to journalists, but according to one source, some Duma deputies consider that Russia has to support these self-proclaimed republics, because they will never be part of Georgia again.
It is the time to remember words of President Putin during the visit of Angela Merkel last week. He reminded us that case of Kosovo would have a lot of consequences for the world.
Now we have the beginning. Who is next?
Popularity: 87% [?]
Tags | Abkhazia, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Peacekeeping, South Ossetia, Trans-Dneister
March 15th, 2008 at 11:54 pm
“The Russian Federation now (after the Kosovo incident) has enough reasons to declare the independence of Abkhazia all over the world. By doing this Russia will establish its international weight.
This will all depend on who follows Russia’s lead. If countries like Germany, Japan, USA, and Australia agree, Russia will establish its international weight. If the followers are the likes of Iran, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, it will be eye-rolling and sighing.
March 16th, 2008 at 2:24 am
As has been noted elsewhere, Russia is probably better off not recognizing the disupted former Soviet territories as independent.
Years of pro-Kosovo independence propaganda, coupled by Russia’s comparative lack of clout (to the US, UK, Germany and France) will likely result in not as many nations recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As is, the number of nations recognizing Kosovo’s independence is low.
The Duma decision can be seen as a step closer to recognzing independence. However, it does not take the form of full diplomatic recognition. Such a recognition will furher limit Russia’s relations with Georgia. This wouldn’t seem like the smartest diplomatic move. The same lack of intelligence for recognzing Kosovo’s independence. Serbia remains an important enough country in the Balkan region. One which has been historically pro-West. It has shown itself more democratic and multi-ethnic tolerant than the repackaged KLA.
In the event of Russian recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the hypocrisy factor against Russia could be heightened. Why those two and not Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) and Nagorno Karabakh?
Keep in mind that under Yeltsin, the Duma voted a statement questioning Crimea’s status in Ukraine. Ukraine then called a UNSC meeting, where the Russian ambassador essentially went against the Duma position.
March 16th, 2008 at 2:53 am
Correction:
That’s: recognizing
Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) is included in the mentioned Duma desire, with Nagorno Karabakh left out. Greater emphasis appears to be on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This probably has to do in part with Russia perhaps having better relations with Moldova when compared to Georgia and Pridnestrovie not bordering Russia.
Why leave Nagorno Karabakh out? Azerbaijan is of arguably greater geo-strategic importance. That country is said to have been sending out feelers to Russia and the West. Note that Azerbaijan pulled its forces out of Kosovo, following the February 17 independence declaration. Along with others, predominately Muslim Azerbaijan isn’t supporting Kosovo’s independence.
March 17th, 2008 at 6:09 am
“Years of pro-Kosovo independence propaganda, coupled by Russia’s comparative lack of clout (to the US, UK, Germany and France) will likely result in not as many nations recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As is, the number of nations recognizing Kosovo’s independence is low.”
(I assume that you’d like to leave the specifics of the Balkans affair aside?)
27 countries in the space of a month compares reasonably well to the 70 or so countries which recognized Bangladesh between December 1971 and May 1972. As I’ve blogged over at my place, Kosovar independence already has a precedent in Bangladeshi’s unilateral declaration of independence, that assurely aided and abetted by Indian military intervention in 1971-2 as Kosovo’s was by NATO intervention in 1999. Kosovar and Bangladeshi independence may share with Eritrea similar motives for independence, lying in the consistent oppression of these three region’s populations by natinoal governments.
In the specific cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so long as “independence” doesn’t mean “annexation by Russia,” I don’t see why not. The principle behind Bangladeshi and Kosovar independence obviously applies to other cases, and Abkhazia appears to fit the model most closely. The brief epoch of governance by independent Tbilisi wasn’t reassuring, and a border has been maintained for close to two decades.
“This probably has to do in part with Russia perhaps having better relations with Moldova when compared to Georgia and Pridnestrovie not bordering Russia.”
Certainly.
“Why leave Nagorno Karabakh out? Azerbaijan is of arguably greater geo-strategic importance. That country is said to have been sending out feelers to Russia and the West. Note that Azerbaijan pulled its forces out of Kosovo, following the February 17 independence declaration. Along with others, predominately Muslim Azerbaijan isn’t supporting Kosovo’s independence.”
It’s not close to Russia’s borders and Russian strategists aren’t interested in copying the Russian-Georgian relationship onto Russia’s relationship with another country.
It’s worth noting that the Bangladeshi-Eritrean-Kosovar precedent in question works only when the central government has been militarily defeated and is incapable of exerting any sovereignty over the secessionist regime. This limits the applicability of this precedent to only a few situations in the world, perhaps that of Sri Lankan Tamils if the LTTE wasn’t crumbling or hypothetical super-competent Chechen separatists.
March 17th, 2008 at 6:23 am
One more thing:
“Why leave Nagorno Karabakh out? Azerbaijan is of arguably greater geo-strategic importance.”
Unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and unlike the Trans-Dniester Republic in Moldova, Nagorno Karabakh is not under Russian occupation. The Armenians seem to be good Russian proxies, yes, but Armenia isn’t–say–an autonomous republic of the Federation like Tatarstan.
March 18th, 2008 at 6:57 am
On the matter of being “good Russia proxies” the Albanian nationalists have made plenty of propaganda claiming themselves to be such for the US.
The mentioned “oppression” in Kosovo blatantly omits the large scale Albanian nationalist terrorism against non-Albanians. A matter that was heightened when the non-Serb dictator Tito granted Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia from 1974-89. The poor governing record of the Albanian nationalists explains why Western occupation forces will continue to be the true masters in Kosovo.
Meantime, UNSCR 1244 clearly stipulates Kosovo remaining a part of Serbia. Iraq and Turkey didn’t lose part of their respective territory for their great crimes against the Kurds. Western neo-liberal and neo-conservative commentary on such matter is grossly inaccurate in its hypocrisy and very selective highlighting of the involved particulars.
From the human rights, historical, economic and political aspects, Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) has a much better case for independence than Kosovo.
Kosovo has never been part of an independent Albania and was never an independent entity unto itself. It has had a firm relationship with Serbia. George Szamuely and Diane Johnstone recently wrote some very spot on commentary about all this in Counterpunch:
http://www.counterpunch.org/johnstone02182008.html
http://www.counterpunch.org/szamuely02152008.html
South Ossetia is akin to North Ossetia. The latter is part of Russia. The disputed former Communist bloc territories have a pre-Soviet relationship with Russia. On the matter of “precedents”, the two Germanys were recently reunited. A precedent showing how territories can be reunited. The comeback of the DDR dissolving can be replied to with the notation that the SSRs also dissolved.
The long drawn out negotiating on Northern Ireland and Cyprus serves as firm proof that there’s no need to quickly enforce a Kosovo settlement against Serbia.
I’ve personally suggested a scenario of Kosovo having full UN and IOC membership as an irrevocbaly autonomus part of Serbia. Soviet era Ukraine and Bealrus had full UN membership. The same standing is true of non-nations Hong Kong, Puerto Rcio and the British Virgin Islands in relation to the IOC.
March 18th, 2008 at 7:28 am
Here’s another erudite commentary on the subject:
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=535
March 18th, 2008 at 12:37 pm
“The mentioned “oppression” in Kosovo blatantly omits the large scale Albanian nationalist terrorism against non-Albanians.”
Nationalist terrorism? So far as I can ascertain, the ethnic conflict in Kosovo in that time was the sort of ethnic conflict you’d an increasingly overpopulated rural province marked by severe competition over resources and a history of mutual massacres (Serbs massacre Albanians in the First Balkan War, Albanians massacre Serbs during the First World War, Serbs massacre Albanians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Albanians massacre Serbs during the Second World War, et cetera), complete with prejudices at the street level.
“Iraq and Turkey didn’t lose part of their respective territory for their great crimes against the Kurds. Western neo-liberal and neo-conservative commentary on such matter is grossly inaccurate in its hypocrisy and very selective highlighting of the involved particulars.”
Iraqi Kurdistan may well become independent, which is that region’s right.
Most of the Kurds in Turkey seem to have decided to go west to the cities of the Aegean coast and Istanbul, voting implicitly against a separate Kurdistan including their areas. That, too, is a right.
Note that, if Iraqi Kurdistan becomes independent, it will be because foreigners won a great military victory over the former sovereign power in Iraq and have since gone on to maintain an occupation regime. In other words, Iraqi Kurdistan would fit the aforementioned Bangladesh-Eritrea-Kosovo paradigm.
“From the human rights, historical, economic and political aspects, Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) has a much better case for independence than Kosovo.”
Why, necessarily? It’s a relatively small scrap of territory run by a nomenklatura that has helped make the territory one of the poorest in Europe, run by people who, as an emigrant told me, manage to combine the worst of communism with the worst of capitalism.
Still, if Transistrians want to be independent despite all that, that’s fine. How this relates to a Kosovo that seems to be governed more functionally than that is beyond me.
“Kosovo has never been part of an independent Albania”
That question hasn’t been raieed, not by me, not by any of the responsible in Kosovo, not by anyone in the Republic of Albania. In fact, pan-Albanian nationalism seems to be much weaker than pan-Serb nationalism–no one wants a unified Greater Albania, scary and unrealistic maps by defunct and/or marginal groups aside.
“and was never an independent entity unto itself.”
… and? Like Kosovo, before 1945 Slovenia was never an independent entity unto itself, Slovenia constituting a collection of provinces and scraps of provinces under the Hapsburgs, at best making up a banovina in the latter days of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Should Slovenia be immediately transferred to Austrian sovereignty?
“It has had a firm relationship with Serbia.”
OK. Why didn’t the democratic Serbian government put forward a plan to make Serbia a binational country like Belgium or Canada?
“On the matter of “precedents”, the two Germanys were recently reunited. A precedent showing how territories can be reunited. The comeback of the DDR dissolving can be replied to with the notation that the SSRs also dissolved.”
That’s not precise. If North Ossetia was an independent state, that would be completely unobjectionable. As it isn’t such, and is in fact a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, Ossetian reunification in the current cirucmstances looks a lot like a Russian landgrab.
Note that Abkhazia, as I’ve said, is a different matter altogether.
“The long drawn out negotiating on Northern Ireland and Cyprus serves as firm proof that there’s no need to quickly enforce a Kosovo settlement against Serbia.”
In the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, British sovereignty in those six counties and the armed Turkish presence in the north of that island haven’t been seriously questioned. They really can’t be, in light of the Protestant and Turkish majorities in those territories. Again, Kosovo is altogether different in that regard, having a decidedly large non-Serb majority going back at least a century and not having been governed from Belgrade since 1999.
“I’ve personally suggested a scenario of Kosovo having full UN and IOC membership as an irrevocbaly autonomus part of Serbia. Soviet era Ukraine and Bealrus had full UN membership. The same standing is true of non-nations Hong Kong, Puerto Rcio and the British Virgin Islands in relation to the IOC.”
Out of curiosity, what incentives do Kosovars and the Kosovar government have to accept that?
March 19th, 2008 at 9:07 am
For openers, Kosovo isn’t exclusively Albanian land by any stretch of international decency. Only taking into consideration the Albanian (”Kosovar”) view is overtly partisan advocacy. Unlike the US government, Russia takes the objective position of seeking a mutual accord between both parties.
It’s only in the last 100 years that Kosovo became an Albanian majority. This due in large part to ethnic cleansing campaigns against Serbs and massive migration from Albania to Kosovo, with much of it being illegal.
The point about Northern Ireland and Cyprus is that those conflicts saw/see a prolonged negotiating process. In comparison, there’s no legitimate need to rush an unfair solution to Kosovo. On Turkey, its eastern flank is heavily populated by Kurds. The Turks were more brutal towards the Kurds than the Serbs towards the Albanians. Keeping in mind that the Albanians have had their share of brutal manner.
Kosovo is roughly 15% of Serb territory. Why wasn’t the mostly Serb populated Krajina (since ethnically cleansed of its Serb majority) within Croatia’s Communist drawn boundaries given autonomy by the half-Slovene/half-Croat dictator Tito? He gave it to Kosovo, after which the terrorism against non-Albanians increased. Democratic multi-ethnic Serbia is on record for supporting mass autonomy for Kosovo.
Unlike Kosovo, North Ossetia is a republic in a federation. South Ossetia and North Ossetia have a lengthy past as being jointly affiliated with a state whose capital is in Russia.
You’re very wrong about claiming a greater nationalism on the part of the Serbs. Maps of Greater Albania appear much more prevalent than those of a Greater Serbia. The “nationalist” Serb Radical Party has much better relations with minorities (particularly Slovaks, Roma and Romanians) than the repackaged KLA in Pristina. Over the decades, Albanians left Albania to settle in Serbia. You don’t see non-Albanians trying to enter Albania.
Pridnestrovie’s government is noticeably less brutal and corrupt than the repackaged KLA in Pristina. Pridnestrovie’s government also presides over a society at multi-ethnic peace much unlike the ethnically divisive Albanian nationalist politicians in Pristina. Pridnestrovie’s government fares well in a comparison with Moldova’s. There’re countries with less land mass and-or population than Pridnestrovie. Historically, Pridnestroive isn’t as related to Moldova when compared to Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia. Socio-economically, Pridnestrovie is better off than Moldova and Kosovo.
Kosovo’s “government” isn’t more “functional’ than Pridnestrovie’s. The repackaged KLA are linked to organized crime. Kosovo’s “independence” is a farce. At present quite possibly the years to come, a Western force will be the ones with the great power in Kosovo.
Slovenia is 90% Slovenian and has been such for quite some time. As previously noted, Kosovo’s sudden (over the past 100 years) demographic change is the large result of ethnic cleansing campaigns and migration (much of it illegal).
March 19th, 2008 at 11:13 am
Once again, there’s UNSCR 1244, supporting the legitimate Serb claim on Kosovo and contradicting the circumspect decision (put mildly) of some to recognize Kosovo’s independence.
March 19th, 2008 at 12:08 pm
Mike, just in case, the word “circumspect” means prudent, well-considered.
March 19th, 2008 at 12:45 pm
Should read as suspect.
March 19th, 2008 at 1:22 pm
“It’s only in the last 100 years that Kosovo became an Albanian majority. This due in large part to ethnic cleansing campaigns against Serbs and massive migration from Albania to Kosovo, with much of it being illegal.”
That really isn’t factual. Travellers in the region noticed a slight Albanian majority overall, in the range of 60-65% of the total population, this majority becoming stronger in the south and a minority in the south. Kosovo became Albanian, it seems, as part of the south-to-north migrations that saw Vojvodina become Serbian.
“In comparison, there’s no legitimate need to rush an unfair solution to Kosovo. On Turkey, its eastern flank is heavily populated by Kurds. The Turks were more brutal towards the Kurds than the Serbs towards the Albanians. Keeping in mind that the Albanians have had their share of brutal manner.”
Why is it an unfair solution? I’d approve of Kurdish independence in Turkey if it was practical, preferably through peaceful measures but as a post-conflict outcome if necessary. That won’t happen, because Turkey’s leaders are much more intelligent and pragmatic than their Serbian counterparts.
“Kosovo is roughly 15% of Serb territory.”
… and?
“Why wasn’t the mostly Serb populated Krajina (since ethnically cleansed of its Serb majority) within Croatia’s Communist drawn boundaries given autonomy by the half-Slovene/half-Croat dictator Tito?”
It wasn’t given autonomy, perhaps, because it didn’t constitute a self-contained unit and was dependent on ties with Zagreb, and because the Serb majority was never higher than 60%? Tito did transfer territories from eastern Croatia (Srem?) to Vojvodina, so he was hardly the unregenerate roatophile you portray him as being.
“He gave it to Kosovo, after which the terrorism against non-Albanians increased. Democratic multi-ethnic Serbia is on record for supporting mass autonomy for Kosovo.”
Should it be believed? See Vladimir Arsenejevic’s “Our negroes, our Albanians.”
“Unlike Kosovo, North Ossetia is a republic in a federation. South Ossetia and North Ossetia have a lengthy past as being jointly affiliated with a state whose capital is in Russia.”
But that’s still a landgrab by a larger state against a smaller. I can be convinced, mind–I have been for Abkhazia–but South Ossetia takes more prodding. What borders would be included?
“You’re very wrong about claiming a greater nationalism on the part of the Serbs. Maps of Greater Albania appear much more prevalent than those of a Greater Serbia.”
Cite, please? It’s a simple fact that while people in Republika Srpska have been widely talking about unifying with Serbia, their homologues in Kosovo haven’t been talking about unifying with the Republic of Albania.
“The “nationalist” Serb Radical Party has much better relations with minorities (particularly Slovaks, Roma and Romanians) than the repackaged KLA in Pristina.”
That’s why a leading Radical is on the record as teling Hungary that if Hugnary recognizes Kosovo, things might happen to the Magyars in Vojvodina (nudge nudge wink wink).
“Over the decades, Albanians left Albania to settle in Serbia.”
When did this happen? It wouldn’t have happenedin the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, since that regime encouraged the mass emigration of Albanians and other Muslims to Turkey. It doesn’t make sense that this would happen under the Stalinist regime in Albania, since returning emigrants would bring the sorts of stories about rich Yugoslavia that North Korea’s leaders keep their country hermetically sealed off. It couldn’t have been after the fall of Communism, since Albanians from the Republic of Albania went overwhelmingly to rich First World Italy and Greece than to a strongly anti-Albanian Serbia that was about it see its GDP halved. It couldn’t have been after 1999, since Kosovo was a place that people left in huge numbers rather than a magnet for population movements.
“You don’t see non-Albanians trying to enter Albania.”
Although you’re apparently starting to see Kosovars. After a decade of relative mismanagement in Serbia and reasonably good outcomes in Albania, Albania has managed to close a good bit of the economic gap.
“Pridnestrovie’s government is noticeably less brutal and corrupt than the repackaged KLA in Pristina. Pridnestrovie’s government also presides over a society at multi-ethnic peace much unlike the ethnically divisive Albanian nationalist politicians in Pristina.”
The bans on Latin-script schooling included?
“There’re countries with less land mass and-or population than Pridnestrovie.”
And less contiguous land?
“Historically, Pridnestroive isn’t as related to Moldova when compared to Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.”
It was an integral part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1945. Isn’t that 1945 benchmark enough?
“Socio-economically, Pridnestrovie is better off than Moldova and Kosovo.”
That’s, hmm. I’ll have to ask for cites.
The case that you’ve made for Transnistria is at least as strong as that which could be made for Kosovo. There was never any mass expulsion of Transnistrians by the Moldovan state, for instance.
“Kosovo’s “government” isn’t more “functional’ than Pridnestrovie’s. The repackaged KLA are linked to organized crime. Kosovo’s “independence” is a farce.”
Why? As a sovereign state, Kosovo can enter into relations with all manner of sovereign states and multilateral agencies in a way that even a highly-autonomous province can’t. Québec might have a foreign affairs ministry, but it can only do what the Canadian government will let it do. Kosovo won’t face such constraints.
“At present quite possibly the years to come, a Western force will be the ones with the great power in Kosovo.”
… and?
Question: Are Russian military forces still deployed in Transnistria?
“Slovenia is 90% Slovenian and has been such for quite some time.”
But Slovenia was never a historical unit unto itself, which you yourself have defined as key to any nation hoping to prove its independence. Either you’re right that Slovenia should be disaggregated into its component parts and transferred to Austria or, in some cases, Italy, or you’re wrong and independence makes as much sense for Slovenia as for Kosovo.
(As for the lack of ethnic cleansing, well, look at what happened to Istrian Italians and Gottschee Germans.)
March 19th, 2008 at 2:09 pm
Among other evidence, I understand that there’s Ottoman Turkish census data supporting the fact that Albanians replaced Serbs in Kosovo as a majority over the past 100 years.
Your recent note doesn’t give a date of the stated 60%-65% claim.
Turkey’s leaders have been far more brutal, less democratic and multi-ethnically tolerant than their Serb counterparts. For their part, the repackaged KLA leadership in Pristina aren’t more democratic and multi-ethnically tolerant than the Serb political establishment.
As for your “Negroes” reference, the autonomy given to Kosovo is akin to the problems of “states’ rights” in the US. It’s the non-Albanians of Kosovo who have suffered the brunt of nationalist violence.
Are you saying that Abkhazia has a better case than South Ossetia? A common Georgian complaint pertains to the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in an area (Abkhazia) where Georgians were said to have outnumbered Abkhaz.
Maps of Greater Albania seem to far outweigh those of Greater Serbia. A recent poll shows most Albanians preferring to live in one state. Republika Srpska seems to be at a considerably more peaceful level than Kosovo. Non-Serbs have arrived in RS. This includes shrines being built for them. In Kosovo, Serb shrines continue to be destroyed by nationalist thugs.
You didn’t successfully refute the fact based claim that the Serb Radical Party has a much better record of dealing with minorities (particularly the Roma, Romanian and Slovak communities) when compared to the repackaged KLA leadership. It’s bogus to pretend that Hungarian nationalist transgressions are non-evident. Several years ago, the Hungarian government came out with a report saying that Serbia’s ethnic Hungarians were better off than their kin in Romania and Slovakia. The Radical Party mayor of Novi Sad denounced a recent wave of foreign (as in from outside of Serbia and non-ethnic Serb) neo-Nazi violence in his city.
It’s no secret that many Albanians have illegally left Albania for Serbia during the Hoxha years as well as before. For that matter, North Koreans are known to have fled the DPRK for China. The Kosovo-Albania border has been difficult to police much like the US-Mexican one. Letting Albanians into Kosovo served Tito well. It helped offset Serb numbers and was a kick in the butt of sorts to his rival Hoxha.
Pridnestrovie was an autonomous region in the USSR before 1940. After WW I and prior to 1940, Moldova was part of Romania. Pridnestrovie was never part of an independent Moldova.
There’s no “ban” of Latin script in Pridnestrovie. Pridnestrovie has a considerably far more progressive language policy than Estonia and Latvia. Western countries hypocritically presented the Latin script issue to Pridnestrovie. In turn, Pridnestrovie saw to it that Latin script can be taught. It’s not that popular there.
You have things upside down when comparing Pridnestrovie to Kosovo. The three communities in Pridnestrovie haven’t experienced mass instances of ethnic cleaning. Moreover, the Western occupation force in Kosovo are the ones with the real power, thereby making Kosovo’s claimed “independence” a farce. Russian peacekeeping forces in Pridnestrovie played a positive role in ending the brief war there. Unlike the American government, Russia isn’t so partisan. It doesn’t recognize Pridnestrovie as an independent state, while encouraging ongoing negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
On Slovenia, the fact of the matter is that it’s 90% ethnically Slovenian, inclusive of it being a former Yugo republic unlike Kosovo, which is part of the Serb republic. To my knowledge, Slovenia didn’t become 90% ethnically Slovenian on account of ethnic cleansing campaigns and mass migration from abroad.
You once again don’t address the matter of UNSCR 1244.
March 20th, 2008 at 7:07 am
Mr. MacDonald
Getting back to your last set of comments:
Your explanation on why the largely Serb inhabited Krajina wasn’t given autonomy within Croatia’s Communist drawn boundaries, unlike Kosovo in Serbia overlooks that Vojvodina was also given autonomy within Serbia. This despite Vojvodina having non-Serb ethnic contituencies totalling under 50%.
Please expand on your “contiguous” boundary claim in relation to Pridnestrovie. There’re internationally recognized countries with less land mass and-or population than Pridnestrovie.
Your reference to other ethnic cleansing campaigns reflects a rather old world way of looking at things. This plays well into the ethnically divisive situation in Kosovo. Serbia minus Kosovo has shown itself more responsible than the repackaged KLA in Pristina.
Without Serb approval, Kosovo will not make it into the UN. This is why my suggested settlement plan is within reason. From the looks of things, it’s the most even handed attempt at trying to please both sides.
March 20th, 2008 at 7:54 am
BTW, why second guess Slovenia’s existence over Bosnia?
The Christian majority in Bosnia would probably support a partition of that entity.
I recall Kissinger referring to it as a hodge podge, much unlike the other former Yugo republics.
March 21st, 2008 at 5:00 am
1. For the past few centuries, there seems to have been a northwards shift in populations in that part of the western Balkans, with Albanians moving into Kosovo and Serbs moving into Vojvodina. This movement, from poorer areas to richer ones, has continued to this day. As late as the 1931 Yugoslav census, the Serb percentage of Vojvodina’s population (33) was considerably less than the 47% plurality of Hungarians and Germans combined.
As for Kosovo, the Ottoman censuses weren’t really very good censuses, relying upon religion instead of ethnicity or language and not using modern methods. Many of the censues and the notes of travellers do suggest a population divided between Albanians and Serbs, one group or the other predominating.
By the early 20th century, different observers (1) seem to have settled by saying that two-thirds or so of Kosovo’s population was Albanians, Tim Judah (Kosovo: War and Revenge) summing up the situation by saying that “much of the southern and western parts of Kosovo were thoroughly Albanian” but “that other parts had compact Serbian populations, especially in the east and from Mitrovica to the then Serbian border” (15). The 1921 Yugoslav census did return figures suggesting that, of the four hundred thousand people in Kosovo, three-quarters were Muslims and two-thirds of the total population were Albanian by language.
I’d like to apologize for misattributing Vladimir Arsenijevic’ Sign and Sight essay “Iur negroes, our enemies”. In that essay, Arsenijevic talks about how successive Serbian governments have constructed Albanians as the Other.
One of the legends that did the rounds in Milosevic’s version of the news was a historical myth that went roughly like this: “Once there were far fewer Albanians than Serbs in Kosovo. But over the years (by means of a miracle that has never been fully explained! V.A.) they came to Kosovo across the Albanian border and just settled here in our country, before our very eyes, without so much as a ‘by your leave’.” Equipped with what in our eyes were positively animal-like qualities, they developed the collective determination of termites and, what is more, bred like rabbits. Their uncontrollable virility and high birth rates made us shiver, indeed we shuddered with disgust. At the same time the Serbs were constantly being publicly entreated to profess their hatred of the “shiptars.” No Serb was considered worth his salt unless he cherished this hatred. Thus official propaganda during the Milosevic era, supported unerringly by the media, declared the “shiptars” to be the Serbs’ archetypal enemy; indeed, without this enemy the Serbs’ own existence would have been practically unthinkable. For where would Batman be without his Joker? Now the “shiptars” were no longer pathetic Uncle Toms. On the contrary, they had transformed themselves into terrifying, dangerous demons, intractable and persistent in their mission to take over our historic territory, to snatch away from us the Kosovo Polje, the Kosovo Field, “the cradle or our culture,” to steal our myths, to rob us of that which belonged to us by “historic right”.
2. Turkey’s policy towards its Kurds hasn’t been good, but Turkish society is more complicated than that. Kurds who assimilated, like members of many minority ethnic groups which assimilated into a melting-pot society, could rise high–Turgut Özal was partly of Kurdish background. The Turkish state reacted, and has reacted very badly, to potentially separatist groups, not to the apoliticized existence of those ethnic groups, or the people who belonged to them.
Shall we make comparisons to Serbia. Fine. Could anyone seriously imagine an Albanian president of Serbia, or a Serbia that was bilingual in Serbian and Albanian like Canada is bilingual in English and French?
3. On the subject of Abkhazia, I tend to agree with Thomas de Waal that although Abkhazia has a weaker case (Abkhazia lacked a pre-1991 Abkhaz majority, Abkhazia is potentially a less viable state, Abkhazia hasn’t been removed by the UN from the sovereignty of its parent state) it’s case is still relatively plausible and deserves to be heard. More, unlike a South Ossetia with disputed borders, Abkhazia has a defined frontier.
even after the genocidal massacres at Srebrenica, that city hasn’t been transferred to the sovereignty of the Bosnian-Croat Federation. Even Republika Srpska’s sovereignty over Srebrenica derives entirely from the mass slaughter of thousands of the people who lived there, it can count on holding that indefinitely.
4. Please provide a link to this poll. The Economist cites a 2005 poll in Kosovo that 90% wanted independence but only 10% wanted to unite with Albania. In greater detail,
2004 conclusions of the International Crisis Group suggest that pan-Albanianism just isn’t popular.
ICG’s research suggests that notions of pan-Albanianism are far more layered and complex than the usual broad brush characterisations of ethnic Albanians simply bent on achieving a greater Albania or a greater Kosovo. It is instructive that both the KLA and NLA started to gain popular support in Kosovo and Macedonia respectively at precisely the time when they moved away from their initial pan-Albanian nationalist goals and concentrated on more rights for their own people. The “Albanian National Army” (ANA) which overtly advocated a “Greater Albania” agenda, never managed to gain popular credibility. Violence in the cause of a greater Albania, or of any shift of borders, is neither politically popular nor morally justified.
In Albania since the arrival of multiparty politics, poverty and internal political conflict have eclipsed any aspirations towards expanding the state’s boundaries. Albania is more interested in developing cultural and economic ties with Kosovo, whilst maintaining separate statehood; and successive Albanian governments have opted for a strategic partnership with Macedonia as both aspire towards membership of NATO and the European Union.
There remains a risk of conflict in Kosovo, where the question of future status has not yet been resolved. The desire of the vast majority of Kosovo’s population for independence is supported by most Albanians elsewhere in the Balkans. However an independent Kosovo is quite a different matter from a Greater Albania. The international community’s problem is to manage the process of dealing with Kosovo’s final status without destabilising its neighbour.
Albanians from Albania, it turns out, don’t really like Kosovars. Why would they want to build a common state with them?
As for Republika Srpska’s pluralism, all I can say is that a fall in RS’ Serb proportion from 97 to 96% doesn’t indicate a flourishing multiculturalism. At least Dodik acknowledging the Srebrenica massacres.
5. The Serbian Radical AParty was founded by a man, Vojislav Seselj, who made jokes about carving out Croats’ eyeballs with rusty spoons and is now on trial at The Hague for alleged war crimes. It’s true that back in 1999 Seselj seemed worried for Cenak. It’s also true that the 2004 electoral successes of the Radicals coincided with attacks on Vojvodina’s minorities, and that Hungarian political leaders in Vojvodina greeted a Radical official’s warning that things might happen to local Hungarians if not as a welcome warning but as a latent threat.
6. Leaving aside the lack of citations you provide as to migration from Albania to Kosovo, the fact remains that the thing that pushed the numbers of Albanians so high is the very high birthrate among ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. Living in isolated and very traditional rural communities on the fringes of an industrializing Yugoslavia, lacking any particularly close ties with any of the other populations in the country, Albanians were quite resistant to the demographic transition and their population grew in proportion to their world record birthrate. The same, incidentally, is true of Kosovar Serbs; Noel Malcolm claims that the 1981 census showed that Kosovar Serb women were likely to give birth to 3.4 children, versus 1.9 for their counterparts in inner Serbia.
7. As for language freedom, Wikipedia provides an adequate overview of the situation for Latin-script schools in Transnistria.
8. You have things upside down when comparing Pridnestrovie to Kosovo. “The three communities in Pridnestrovie haven’t experienced mass instances of ethnic cleaning.”
I quite agree. It’s always a bad idea to opt into a war that features revolutionary ethnic violence, if only because–as the Sudeten Germans found out after the end of the Second World War–very bad things will happen to you if you lose. Bosnia after 1995 and Kosovo after 1999 are just two of the case studies which demonstrate the exceptional difficulty of restoring multiethnic societies after conflict.
“Moreover, the Western occupation force in Kosovo are the ones with the real power, thereby making Kosovo’s claimed “independence” a farce. Russian peacekeeping forces in Pridnestrovie played a positive role in ending the brief war there.”
The Russian 14th Army mutinied and openly allied with the Transnistrians.
“Unlike the American government, Russia isn’t so partisan. It doesn’t recognize Pridnestrovie as an independent state, while encouraging ongoing negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.”
How better to keep Moldova hanging on?
9. There was mass ethnic cleansing in Slovenia, of Germans (down from 1910’s 103,949 German-speaking people in Slovenia to the 1991 census which recorded “just 745 Germans and Austrians, plus an additional thousand people speaking German as their mother tongue [. . .] about 0.08 percent of the population.” As for the Italians, the estimates seem to suggest that thirty thousand people fled from what was now western Slovenia, mostly Italians.
10. Vojvodina’s Serbs also wanted autonomy, in keeping with the territory’s long tradition of self-rule. As I’m sure you know from your familiarity with the Radicals, even that party has come to accept that principle as it has moved away from eye-gouging.
11. I do think that Kosovo will make it into the UN. Above, I’ve linked to a blog post of mine where I compared Kosovo to Bangladesh, both territories syuffering abusive rule by a central state which, when liberated by foreign armies, went on to declare their independence. The situation facing Bangladesh was quite bleak between the massive Chinese armies on India’s northern frontier and the American aircraft carrier group in the Bay of Bengal and the seventy thousand Pakistani prisoners of war. And yet, despite all those complicating factors, not only did seventy countries recognize Bangladesh in five months (a slower rate, I’d add, than the thirty country which recognized Kosovo in one month), but in three years China and Pakistan dropped their objections to Bangladesh’s United Nations membership.
Kosovo’s UN membership won’t come overnight, I grant you, and not after several years. But it will come and, in the meantime, there’s no reason why Kosovo can’t enjoy the fruits of diplomatic recognition with the growing list of countries which do recognize it. Besides, it isn’t as if Taiwan has been hampered by its near-universal non-recognition. Merging with a Serbia that wants the land but abhors the people is as bad a non-solution as can be imagined.
12. As for UNSCR 1244, a process began, proposal mades, and the process failed. Hence, independence. It’s not the neatest solution, I’ll grant you, but if it worked for Bangladesh (and Eritrea, though that country liberated itself) why not?
March 21st, 2008 at 5:02 am
1. For the past few centuries, there seems to have been a northwards shift in populations in that part of the western Balkans, with Albanians moving into Kosovo and Serbs moving into Vojvodina. This movement, from poorer areas to richer ones, has continued to this day. As late as the 1931 Yugoslav census, the Serb percentage of Vojvodina’s population (33) was considerably less than the 47% plurality of Hungarians and Germans combined.
As for Kosovo, the Ottoman censuses weren’t really very good censuses, relying upon religion instead of ethnicity or language and not using modern methods. Many of the censues and the notes of travellers do suggest a population divided between Albanians and Serbs, one group or the other predominating.
By the early 20th century, different observers (1) seem to have settled by saying that two-thirds or so of Kosovo’s population was Albanians, Tim Judah (Kosovo: War and Revenge) summing up the situation by saying that “much of the southern and western parts of Kosovo were thoroughly Albanian” but “that other parts had compact Serbian populations, especially in the east and from Mitrovica to the then Serbian border” (15). The 1921 Yugoslav census did return figures suggesting that, of the four hundred thousand people in Kosovo, three-quarters were Muslims and two-thirds of the total population were Albanian by language.
I’d like to apologize for misattributing Vladimir Arsenijevic’ Sign and Sight essay “Iur negroes, our enemies”. In that essay, Arsenijevic talks about how successive Serbian governments have constructed Albanians as the Other.
One of the legends that did the rounds in Milosevic’s version of the news was a historical myth that went roughly like this: “Once there were far fewer Albanians than Serbs in Kosovo. But over the years (by means of a miracle that has never been fully explained! V.A.) they came to Kosovo across the Albanian border and just settled here in our country, before our very eyes, without so much as a ‘by your leave’.” Equipped with what in our eyes were positively animal-like qualities, they developed the collective determination of termites and, what is more, bred like rabbits. Their uncontrollable virility and high birth rates made us shiver, indeed we shuddered with disgust. At the same time the Serbs were constantly being publicly entreated to profess their hatred of the “shiptars.” No Serb was considered worth his salt unless he cherished this hatred. Thus official propaganda during the Milosevic era, supported unerringly by the media, declared the “shiptars” to be the Serbs’ archetypal enemy; indeed, without this enemy the Serbs’ own existence would have been practically unthinkable. For where would Batman be without his Joker? Now the “shiptars” were no longer pathetic Uncle Toms. On the contrary, they had transformed themselves into terrifying, dangerous demons, intractable and persistent in their mission to take over our historic territory, to snatch away from us the Kosovo Polje, the Kosovo Field, “the cradle or our culture,” to steal our myths, to rob us of that which belonged to us by “historic right”.
2. Turkey’s policy towards its Kurds hasn’t been good, but Turkish society is more complicated than that. Kurds who assimilated, like members of many minority ethnic groups which assimilated into a melting-pot society, could rise high–Turgut Özal was partly of Kurdish background. The Turkish state reacted, and has reacted very badly, to potentially separatist groups, not to the apoliticized existence of those ethnic groups, or the people who belonged to them.
Shall we make comparisons to Serbia. Fine. Could anyone seriously imagine an Albanian president of Serbia, or a Serbia that was bilingual in Serbian and Albanian like Canada is bilingual in English and French?
3. On the subject of Abkhazia, I tend to agree with Thomas de Waal that although Abkhazia has a weaker case (Abkhazia lacked a pre-1991 Abkhaz majority, Abkhazia is potentially a less viable state, Abkhazia hasn’t been removed by the UN from the sovereignty of its parent state) it’s case is still relatively plausible and deserves to be heard. More, unlike a South Ossetia with disputed borders, Abkhazia has a defined frontier.
4. The Economist cites a 2005 poll in Kosovo that 90% wanted independence but only 10% wanted to unite with Albania. In greater detail,
2004 conclusions of the International Crisis Group suggest that pan-Albanianism just isn’t popular.
ICG’s research suggests that notions of pan-Albanianism are far more layered and complex than the usual broad brush characterisations of ethnic Albanians simply bent on achieving a greater Albania or a greater Kosovo. It is instructive that both the KLA and NLA started to gain popular support in Kosovo and Macedonia respectively at precisely the time when they moved away from their initial pan-Albanian nationalist goals and concentrated on more rights for their own people. The “Albanian National Army” (ANA) which overtly advocated a “Greater Albania” agenda, never managed to gain popular credibility. Violence in the cause of a greater Albania, or of any shift of borders, is neither politically popular nor morally justified.
In Albania since the arrival of multiparty politics, poverty and internal political conflict have eclipsed any aspirations towards expanding the state’s boundaries. Albania is more interested in developing cultural and economic ties with Kosovo, whilst maintaining separate statehood; and successive Albanian governments have opted for a strategic partnership with Macedonia as both aspire towards membership of NATO and the European Union.
There remains a risk of conflict in Kosovo, where the question of future status has not yet been resolved. The desire of the vast majority of Kosovo’s population for independence is supported by most Albanians elsewhere in the Balkans. However an independent Kosovo is quite a different matter from a Greater Albania. The international community’s problem is to manage the process of dealing with Kosovo’s final status without destabilising its neighbour.
Albanians from Albania, it turns out, don’t really like Kosovars. Why would they want to build a common state with them?
As for Republika Srpska’s pluralism, all I can say is that a fall in RS’ Serb proportion from 97 to 96% doesn’t indicate a flourishing multiculturalism. At least Dodik acknowledging the Srebrenica massacres.
March 21st, 2008 at 9:59 am
Since war’s end, mosques are built in Republika Srpska whereas churches are destroyed in Kosovo. As for massacres in Srebrenica, there was the initial one involving the Nasir Oric led massacre of Serbs. As is true with “independent” Kosovo, the RS leadership has its limits, due to the occupation clout of outsiders from the region. The latter kept shooting down fact based RS reports on the Srebrenica massacres. The pro-Izetnegovic side has had a history of trumping up casualty figures. Based on what’s known and not known, the claimed 7000-8000 Muslims males summarily executed at Srebrenica is probably another exaggeration like the total killed during the Bosnian Civil War 200,000 and more versus the recently established 100,000, as well as the absurd rape claims. You say that RS is voer 90% Serb. Present day Kosovo is voer 90% Albanian. Unlike Kosovo, RS has had a comparatively lenghthier status of a republic in name, inclusive of its constitution.
Albanians have their clan differences that result in some violent fighting among themselves. Nevertheless, there’re the Greater Albania maps and a recent poll (more recent than the mentioned Economist one) showing that most Albanians prefer living in one state (will research it upon request). The mentioned 2005 Economist poll is questionable, given that source’s coverage of a number of former Communist bloc issues. The way it describes Pridnestrovie’s leadership in comparison to the repackaged KLA is one of several cases in point. Another of many examples is how its chief central/eastern European person recently described the political mood in Ukraine at a RFE/RL gathering. He highlighted how eastern Ukraine is interested in EU membership without noting that area’s equally if not greater interest in forging closer ties with Russia and Ukraine’s ongoing public opinion opposition to NATO membership. On disputed former Communist bloc territories, said person claims that Russia fears separatist movements in Russia. The fact of the matter is that Pridnestrovie and South Ossetia seek reunification with Russia. There’re others areas which would no doubt express the same desire if given the opportunity. Separating from Russia is nowhere near as popular. Albanian governments have been the most sympathetic towards Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. Northern Albania was a KLA terror base. The not so Serb friendly American diplomat Christopher Hill said that Greater Albania is a threat. He said this at the end of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Albania remains a much poorer place than Serbia. Unlike the repackaged KLA in Pristina, democratic/multi-ethnic Serbia hasn’t threatened force as a political weapon vis-à-vis Kosovo.
The ICG is a Soros propaganda front featuring no semblance of objectivity whatsoever. Among many examples is how it recommended greater Albanian language rights for Macedonia. On the other hand, that org., hasn’t advocated for Estonia and Latvia to do the same relative to the Russian language. A review of ICG members further confirms its heavily skewed way of looking at things. Much like how some continue to gloss over UNSCR 1244.
At this point in time, can anyone seriously imagine an American Hispanic candidate? How about a Muslim PM in Britain? What about an elected Serb official in Kosovo? The fact of the matter is that Serbia minus Kosovo has a good sized Albanian population. By and large, they don’t seem to have many problems.
Turkey has been much more brutal to the Kurds than what the Serbs could be legitimately accused of doing to the Albanians. Moreover, KLA instigated goonery saw Albanians willing to work with state structures threatened and killed.
Your claims of Serb hatred of Albanians grossly overlooks the behavior that has been prevalent on the Albanian nationalist side. Diane Johnstone (whose Counterpunch article I linked at this thread) provides firsthand details. The fact of the matter is that Serbs/Serbia minus Kosovo has the much better record at multi-ethnic relations than the 1974-89 Kosovo Albanians and the pre-repackaged and repackaged KLA.
Tim Judah’s cited claim isn’t more scientifically valid than the mentioned Ottoman Turkish census. In addition, there’re numerous other sources showing how the demographic shift of an Albanian majority in Kosovo is recent (within the last 100-120 years). Some of the core reasons of which can’t be considered as a legitimate basis for suddenly separating Kosovo from Serbia.
You offer nothing to show why Krajina should’ve been denied autonomy within Croatia’s Communist drawn boundaries unlike Vojvodina.
March 21st, 2008 at 10:07 am
That’s the Tito imposed Vojvodina as an autonomus unit within Serbia. For consistency sake, Croatia could’ve very easily been broken up into autonomous regions.
March 21st, 2008 at 10:25 am
If the Kosovo Albanians don’t like Albania, then why do they overwhelimngly prefer the Albanian flag? For decades, many of them sought leaving Hoxhox’s misery, while hoping for the post-Communist day of either a Greater Albania or independent Kosovo. Of recent note, there’ve been rumblings in Macedonia with its Albanian minority.
It’s noteoworthy how some Soros thinking types view ethnic groups in other countries. I recall a Fistful of Euros post cheering for a demise of the ethnic Russian population in Pridnestrovie. Never minding that they’ve behaved in a collectively more responsible manner than those ethnic groups with elements practicing terrorism.
March 21st, 2008 at 8:37 pm
[deletia of Srebrenica denialism]
1. The ethnic homogeneity of the Republika Srpska emerged, from 54 to 97% ion the space of vie years, as a result of massacre and wholesale expulsion. The ethnic homogeneity of Kosovo, at least up to 1981, was the product of a much higher birth rate. Let’s say that that the hundred thousand Serb and Montenegrin emigrants hadn’t left Kosovo by 1981 and had stayed. The Albanian majority recorded in that year’s census would have fallen from 77.4% to 72.8%.
Republika Srpska has existed for only a bit under two decades. An autonomous Kosovo has existed since 1945. Which should take precedence?
2. I’d quite appreciate information on this, more recent, poll, as the evidence I’m familiar with suggests that pan-Albanianism is a politically marginal movement. In Le monde diplomatique (hardly an American agent!) Dérens and Geslin conclude (“The dream of a Greater Albania” that “[a] number of radical, but marginal, militant networks openly campaign for it, but they may not have much popular support. There is still considerable distrust between the citizens of the republic of Albania and the Albanians from former Yugoslavia, long separated by history,” going on to note that “the issue of a national trans-border “Albania” is a reality” to which only European integration can be a final solution.
“The way it describes Pridnestrovie’s leadership in comparison to the repackaged KLA is one of several cases in point.”
Is this about Edward Lucas again?
“At this point in time, can anyone seriously imagine an American Hispanic candidate? How about a Muslim PM in Britain?”
Good points, but the point that I’m trying to make is that for as long as there has been a Yugoslavia, there have been Albanians in Kosovo. For as long as there has been a Republic of Serbia, there have been Albanians in Kosovo, a rapidly growing population, too. Why have they remained on the outside?
“What about an elected Serb official in Kosovo?”
Outside of the north? Point.
“The fact of the matter is that Serbia minus Kosovo has a good sized Albanian population. By and large, they don’t seem to have many problems.”
Half of the sixty thousand Albanians in the Republic of Serbia live in Presevo, famously host to its own rebellion back in the day.
“Your claims of Serb hatred of Albanians”
Not claims, sadly, but verifiable going back at least a century, when the journalist Trotsky among others saw Serbian militia setting fire to the homes of Albanians across Kosovo. This strongly anti-Muslim bias, evidenced by Plavsic when she talked about Bosnian Muslims as genetically defective Bosnian Serbs, was accompanied by a very nasty assault of domestic freedoms inside of Serbia. The backlash against feminism and women’s rights was motivated at least partly by the desire to create a Serbia that was as close to a neo-traditionalist ideal as possible.
“Tim Judah’s cited claim isn’t more scientifically valid than the mentioned Ottoman Turkish census.”
Please provide me with some sorts of citations.
“In addition, there’re numerous other sources showing how the demographic shift of an Albanian majority in Kosovo is recent (within the last 100-120 years).”
The transformation from a two-thirds majority to a five-sixths majority over the lifetime of the SFRY had more to do with higher Albanian birth rates than anything else. For the previous half-century, as Yugoslav censuses confirm, that majority had remained stable.
“If the Kosovo Albanians don’t like Albania, then why do they overwhelimngly prefer the Albanian flag?”
It’s a marker of ethnic identity?
“For decades, many of them sought leaving Hoxhox’s misery, while hoping for the post-Communist day of either a Greater Albania or independent Kosovo.”
Cites that they actually made the trip out, please. As things stand, population increase among Yugoslavia’s Albanians are amply explained by a very high birth rate.
March 22nd, 2008 at 5:00 am
Andy, was that you who deleted the genocide denier bit? I’ve no problems debunking such babble. The kind of crapola that has been levied on Edward Herman and David Petersen for sticking to the facts.
Trotsky was known to stretch things a bit in a certain direction. In more recent times, the same can be said of such journalists as Roy Gutman and Roger Cohen. Peter Brock’s book is a great read on the kind of less than truthful reporting out there on the subject:
http://www.mediacleansing.com/
I’m in the process of reading Belgium journalist Michel Collon’s book on the subject. I’ve yet to see any solid rebuttal to the recent Counterpunch articles of Johnstone and Szamuely.
You take the cake on what to highlight and not highlight. You previously mentioned other ethnic cleansing campaigns that led to the establishment of current borders. Like it or not, Republika Srpska was established as a republic with the approval of the anti-Serb Clinton administration. The 1995 Dayton Accord said that after four years, RS could establish its own parallel relationship with other states. Now, you’ve propaganda fronts like the Bosnian Institute seeking to eliminate RS altogether. Kudos to Tariq Ali for denouncing the anti-Serb venom of that org. As for ethnically cleansed Kosovo, UNSCR 1244 (which you continue to not address) clearly stipulates Kosovo remaining a part of serbia. it alos calls for a limited return of Serb military and civilian government personnel to the province.
You’re factually wrong for saying that an “autonomous” Kosovo has existed since 1945. Such an entity was evident from 1974-89 as a part of the Serb republic in Yugoslavia. That autonomy was changed because of the increased terrorism against non-Albanians during that period.
Your mentioned “rebellion” in Presevo was for good part instigated by Albanians with ties to Kosovo. Ditto some of the Albanian nationalist mayhem in Macedonia. I recall the National Albanian American Council playing advocate for the Albanians of Macedonia. Pan-Albanianism is a factor as Christopher Hill and others have noted. I’ll send a query out on the poll I referenced.
I quickly your numbers of Albanians living in Serbia minus Kosovo. I’ve seen higher figures, especially in relation to the Belgrade area. Again, multi-ethnic Serbia has a comparatively better record dealing with other ethnic groups when compared to Albanians dominated Kosovo.
The matter of Pridnestrovie doesn’t only pertain to Edward Lucas. It relates to sites like Greater Surbiton and Fistful of Euros and other venues having extreme geopolitical double standards on the discussed topic. From the point of view of history, human rights, economics and politics, Kosovo doesn’t have a better case for independence than Pridnestrovie. I don’t think it has a better case than South Ossetia. Kosovo has been part of Serbia since 1912. It was never an independent entity unto itself or a part of an independent Albania. its relationship with Serbia goes back centuries.
UNSCR 1244 isn’t written in a way that supports Kosovo separating from Serbia against Belgrade’s will. It’s quite noteworthy that the EU isn’t a monolith on Kosovo’s independence. Ditto the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other nations. “Independent” Kosovo isn’t independent in terms of actual governance and acceptance in numerous international orgs. like the UN and IOC.
I’ll follow-up on the Kosovo census data over the past 100 years. Meantime, your cite of Judeh isn’t a scientific slam on the Ottoman Turkish census. The demographic change from a Serb to Albanian majority in Kosovo are threefold having to do with ethnic cleansing campaigns, migration from Albania to Kosovo (much of it illegal) and your mentioned high birth rate. Over the decades the migration from Albania to Kosovo has been reasonably measured in the tens of thousands. Much like the illegal migration from Mexico to the US, It’s probably not easy to give a direct pinpoint figure. In a recent post, you seemed to acknowledge this with a statement about southern based people moving north.
In an effort to deflate Serbia’s claim on Kosovo, Albanian nationalists portray the province as being initially inhabited by Albanians. In conjunction with that view is the comment about Slavs arriving in the Balkans after the Albanians. The origin of the Albanians is a matter of historical debate. It is said that modern day Albanians are likely derived from one or more groups, who were in the Balkans before the Slavs. In terms of significant numbers and a well established presence, reasonable evidence indicates that the Serbs predominated the Kosovo area of the Balkans before the Albanians. More recent history shows that the Albanian numbers in Kosovo started to increase in the 15th century, after the region had a noticeably inhabited Serb makeup.
Regarding some of the discussion at this thread:
American Council for Kosovo
http://savekosovo.org/default.asp
Edward Herman, “Book Review: Travesty”, Z Magazine Online, Apr. 2007
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Apr2007/hermanpr0407.html
G. Richard Jansen, “Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated History”, Colorado State University, June 15, 2007
http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html
Adrian Karatnycky, “The Condescension of the Christian West”, First Things, Aug./Sept. 1999
http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9908/opinion/karatnycky.html
Nebojsa Malic, “The Suspended Castle: Kosovo’s Unsustainable Independence Claim”, Antiwar.com, Nov. 2, 2000
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m110200.html
March 22nd, 2008 at 5:35 am
On the mentioned migration from Albania to Kosovo over the last 100 years, its should read as at least in the tens of thousands. It has been suggestively put in the hundreds of thousands. One thing for sure: it has been a key factor in the demographic change, to go along with the ethnic cleansing campaigns and comparatively high birth rate of the Albanians.
March 22nd, 2008 at 7:07 am
Upon a quick persusal, I just came across this piece which discusses Kosovo’s demographic change:
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/michaletos/030.shtml
It’s pretty much in sync with what I’ve found elsewhere.
In comparison, the quoted Tim Judah doesn’t offer an authoritative counterclaim.
March 22nd, 2008 at 7:12 am
Poll: Over 90% of Albanians in One State
http://www.makfax.com.mk/look/novina/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=2&NrArticle=100374&NrIssue=576&NrSection=10
March 22nd, 2008 at 7:16 am
An acquaintance of mine just forwarded this note:
Around 25 years ago I was at the State Library of Victoria (Melbourne) looking up something or rather and I found on a shelf a hard cover annual book from Yugoslavia. It was published by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, it was hard cover and written in Cyrilic. It contained a range of statistic including annual budgets, outputs and I suspect demographics. I have been meaning to visit the library and see if I can find the book, for simlar reasons. This gives me a good reason to try tomorrow. It is now after 5.00 pm Saturday. It will be shut. But being Easter not sure it would be open.
The Metropolitan Library (I think) in New York has a branch on Slavic studies, containing a host of information and publications for those interested in Slavic studies. I looked it up when I visited New York in 1998, but it was shut on the day I visited; a Tuesday from recollection. If you have time, pay them a visit and see what you can find there.
Also, a good source, at least in headlines terms is to go to the NY Times website and search the archives. Type in subject and period, and you will find, as I did, a headline going back to around 1874 which reported that Serbs in large numbers were being driven out of Kosovo by Albanians.
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:44 am
I followed some of the discourse on Kosovo with interest.
Randy McDonald is missing several important facts when promoting/supporting Kosovo’s independence.
The proper name is Kosovo i Metohija, indicating an amalgam of two territories, Kosovo and Metihija. The reference to Metohia clearly indicates the monastic influences of the Serbian Orthox Church in the region dating back to the 11th century. Serbia had established an independent Kingdom, within the Byzantine state as far back as the 12th Century, stretching from the Danube to Greece.
Regarding Kosovo’s population mix. It is often quoted in the media that 50% of Kosovo’s population is under 21 years of age i.e. born after 1987, about the time Molosevic was elected to public office in Serbia.
Interpolating that statistic, it becomes clear that the ethnic mix of Kosovo was vastly different a decade earlier.
A Radio Free Europe Reasearch (see links below) shows some statistics from 1971 and a decade earlier. It shows that over the 10 years to 1971, Kosovo’s population doubled from 664,000 to 1.244 million. The number of people identifying themselves as Albanian had increased by 570,000 people (10.25% per annam!!), to represent 73.8% of the population, compared to 67.1 in 1961. That is a 265% increase in the number of Albanians. A decade or so earlier (1945-1950) Albanians would have represented 50% of Kosovo’s population and possibly less.
By comparison, the Serbian population grew by a mere 1,500 persons. This is during the golden years of economic prosperity globally and in Yugoslavia and during which the population grew throughout Yugoslavia. The post war baby-boom was not unique to the West.
Such statistics support the hypothesis that:
1. Kosovo Albanians had a higher than normal birth rate - but even this alone would not fully explain the 10.25% population growth.
2. Influx of illegal immigration from Albania - would account for a large proportion.
3. Ongoing pograms against Serbs, forcing their departure in large numbers - definitely. Even a modest 2.5% growth should have seen the number of Serbs closer to 300,000.
4. A plagua the only affected Serbs. Pigs might fly too.
However you look at it, Kosovo should not have been given to the Albanians on a platter. They had no legal or moral right to it.
Website: http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/3-1-72.shtml
original PDF document: http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/3-1-72.pdf
March 22nd, 2008 at 10:14 am
Andy, was that you who deleted the genocide denier bit?
Not me. What Genocide denier bit?
March 22nd, 2008 at 10:29 am
Not me.
That’s denial, that is.
March 22nd, 2008 at 1:08 pm
Andy: I’m referring to this at the top of Randy MacDonald’s last post:
“deletia of Srebrenica denialism]”
I’m not the denier in terms of what happened there with Nasir Oric as well as what’s reasonably known and not known about the second and more popularized massacre involving serb on Muslim violence.
Here’s some other thread related material just forwarded to my attention:
“A Response to Noel Malcolm’s Book: Kosovo, a Short History”
http://www.kosovo.net/nmalk.html.
Also, “Kosovo and Metohia: A Historical Survey” by Dusan T. Batakovic
http://www.kosovo.net/default3.html
Here is a demographic study, “The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-1986″
http://www.rastko.org.yu/kosovo/istorija/kosovo_migrations/index.html
March 22nd, 2008 at 1:25 pm
Some other material just forwarded to me. One can find all three elements of migration from Albania to Kosovo, terrorism against Slavic Orthodox Christians and the comparatively high brth rate of Albanians. Nothing giving credence to an existing Albanian majority in Kosovo before WW II.
Somoene noted to me that the Ottoman census data if anything might’ve underrepresented the Serb numbers, rather than inflate them. Once gain, note that Kosovo was never part of an independent Albania, or an independent entity unto itself. Centuries before 1912, Kosovo had been part of an earlier Serb nation.
The bottom line is that Kosovo doesn’t have a better case for independence than pridnestyrovie when comparing history, human rights, overall demographics through the decades and centuries and political structure. To a lesser extent: when reviewing those key factors, South Ossetia arguably has a bertter case as well. Recognizing Kosovo’s independence while denying it to others skews the international system of judging independence. MMA
****
EMIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHY IN KOSOVO, By Steve Reiquam
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/118-2-80.shtml
498,000 (68.5%) in 1948; 647,000
(67.2%) in 1961; 916,000 (73.7%) in 1971; and 1,227,000 (77.5%) in 1981.
The Serbian population of Kosovo, in contrast, increased in only
absolute terms (171,000, 189,000, 227,000, and 228,000 in 1948, 1953,
1961, and 1971, respectively), while initially stagnating and then
declining in relative terms (23.6%, 23.5%, 23.6%, and 18.4%). By 1981,
however, there were 209,792 Serbs in Kosovo, comprising only 13.2%
of the total population. Therefore, between 1971 and 1981, the number
of Serbs in Kosovo decreased by 18,472 in absolute terms.
The Montenegrin population of Kosovo increased during the first
three censuses after World War II (28,000, 31,000, and 37,000 in 1948,
1951, and 1961, respectively), while in 1971 and 1981 their total
population dropped first to 31,500 in 1971 and then to 26,000 in 1981.
In 1981 the Montenegrins accounted for only 1.7% of the total Kosovo
population.
pressure exerted on Serbs and Montenegrins by Albanians, including “many
cases of physical attack, attempted rape, damage to crops, [and
the] desecration of Serbian monuments and gravestones,” has
created a tense atmosphere conducive to Slav emigration from the
area.
II) http://www.vor.ru/Kosovo/history_eng.html
Kosovo was annexed to Serbia after the Balkan war of 1912-1913 when the number of Serbs and Albanians was nearly equal. Albanians began to arrive in Kosovo in great numbers during the Second World War after the province was occupied by the Nazis. Thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins were forced to leave Kosovo while Albanians came to settle there from Albania.
III)eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1132.html
Before WWII, there were approximately an equal number of Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo.
IV) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/kosovo.htm
By the time the Serbs reclaimed Kosovo in the Balkans Wars of 1912 to 1913, ethnic Albanians made up a significant portion of the population. They became a majority by the 1950s as their birth rate boomed and Serbs continued to migrate north
V)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Kosovo
Numerous colonist Serb families moved into Kosovo, equalizing the demographic balance between Albanians and Serbs. Kosovo’s status within Serbia was finalised the following year at the Treaty of London.
VI)
http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/~gene/migr.html
6th paragraph
By some accounts as many as 80,000 out of perhaps three-quarters of a million Serbs fled with them, settling in eastern Slavonia and the Hungarian plain. These are not inconsiderable migrations. (In the late 17th century from Kosovo.
VII) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo
The non-Serbian population of Kosovo didn’t exceed 2% by the end of the 14th century.
VIII) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo
A study done in 1871 by Austrian colonel Peter Kukulj for the internal use of the Austro-Hungarian army showed that the mutesarifluk of Prizren (corresponding largely to present-day Kosovo) had some 500,000 inhabitants, of which:
318,000 Serbs (64%),
161,000 Albanians (32%)
IX) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo
Map of Alfred Stead, published in 1909 , shows that similar numbers of Serbs and Albanians were living in the territory.
March 22nd, 2008 at 2:08 pm
I just received Savo Heleta’s book on his experiences as a child, which included living with Muslims in Gorazde. Unlike lying Rajmonda: http://www.aeronautics.ru/nws001/cbc01.htm, Heleta’s account appears believable. Mind you that he was raised in believing the multi-ethnic Yugoslav ideal as a secular Serb. He details the prevalent Muslim nationalism, which contrary to anti-Serb folklore wasn’t created by “Serb nationalists”.
Info. on Heleta and his book:
http://www.savoheleta.com/
A recent article of his on Kosovo:
http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/content/view/7744/110/
March 22nd, 2008 at 3:14 pm
Michael, thanks for the info about my book.
To go back to the topic of Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence, those countries that supported independence argue that Kosovo is a unique case in the world. They say that Serbia lost its right to govern the province because of the deep-rooted conflict and mistrust between the two ethnic groups.
What about an independent Palestine, Kurdistan, Tibet, Tamil region in Sri Lanka, and many others? Secessionist tendencies, mistrust, and deep-rooted conflict are not unique to Kosovo only.
Tibet is already burning. We may see further escalation of conflict in the Basque region of Spain and parts of France, fighting for independent Kurdistan in Iraq and Turkey, problems in Romania, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, China, the whole African continent with its colonial borders, and elsewhere. German Spiegel comments that “many countries fear that their separatist groups could choose to emulate developments in the Balkans.”
After Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence received support around the world, it will be hard to say no to others who attempt the same.
SAVO HELETA
Author of “Not My Turn to Die:
Memoirs of a Broken Childhood in Bosnia”
http://savoheleta.livejournal.com
March 22nd, 2008 at 3:34 pm
Savo & Co:
Hypocrisy reeks big time. Several paleoconservative leaning individuals have noted how Soros and his clique are most anti-nationalist towards those not so willing to accept his attempt to dominate a situation.
On the other hand, Soros and his clique become noticeably more friendly to those nationalisms (like the Albanian variant) willing to accept his support.
From a pont of view of Western interests, it makes little sense to go against the Russian and Serb position on Kosovo. Russia has a growing economy and despite years of hypocrically applied sanctions and other hostile actions, the Serb economy is still an important one in the Balkan region.
From Rambouillet to the present, the Albanian nationalists have been diplomatically spoiled into not accepting a reasonable compromise. The overall situation is such in Kosovo that the Serb position can’t be disrespected in the manner which has been exhibited.
At present, you’ve a socio-economically dire situation in Kosovo, coupled with the Albanians not actually calling much of the shots in that province. Over time, this has the potential for futher turmoil.
It remains a much better alternative to get back to the negotiating table. This goes back to my earlier drafted settlement propsal which seems to come closest to satisfying the conflicting Serb and Albanian stances. Until then, Kosovo will likley remain a state that’s not truly independent in governance, while being kept out of major international organizations.
March 22nd, 2008 at 4:10 pm
I should add that when it comes to the former Communist bloc the neocons and Sorosioan neolibs tend to march lock step.
Mark MacKinnon’s book entitled “The New Cold War” provided some insight on their activity in the former Communist bloc (see: http://www.siberianlight.net/2007/11/15/book-review-the-new-cold-war-by-mark-mackinnon/ ).
In addition to SL, I’m glad that there’re sites like http://www.counterpunch.org - http://www.antiwar.com & http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org along with http://www.serbianna.com and http://tiraspoltimes.com
At the same time org’s. like the Soros funded/influenced ICG and OSI have much clout. Media oulets like PBS, NPR and The NYT tend to favor those sources.
Something to perhaps think about when bashing Russian media for real and-or exaggerated faults.
March 22nd, 2008 at 6:53 pm
Some more on Kosovo, including the province’s demographics:
http://www.sanu.ac.yu/Eng/News/kosovo.htm
March 22nd, 2008 at 7:18 pm
Some more on Greater Albania:
http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/21950
March 22nd, 2008 at 7:47 pm
At risk of getting my head removed here, I must say something. Ireland, the lead peacekeeping force in Kosovo and herself a neutral country with no material interest in the region whatsoever, has recognised Kosovo’s independence. Why so? Ireland steers as far clear as possible of warring sides in conflicts, only sending in troops to clean up the mess (e.g. the Congo, Labanon, Liberia). Ireland also clearly has a lot of knowledge of the area, as Mike Averko himself has said before . Why did she see fit to recognise it? I’m asking this in the sense that Ireland has clearly no agendas there and knows a lot about it. Why would country like Ireland, with no axe to grind, recognise it if it didnt have a good case for independence?
March 22nd, 2008 at 8:12 pm
Why do other EU member states not recognize it? Ditto a number of nations in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. A number of other countries as well. Some of them having no “axe to grind”.
As for what I said about Ireland in Kosovo: their peacekeepers did a comparatively better job than their peers in confronting the anti-Serb violence in 2004.
Recognizing former Yug republics as independent states is one thing. Kosovo doesn’t fit that category.
The Northern Ireland and Cyprus disputes have been given lenghty time for a negotiating process. There’s no legitimate reason whatsoever to rush an unfair process in Kosovo.
March 22nd, 2008 at 8:40 pm
”The Northern Ireland and Cyprus disputes have been given lenghty time for a negotiating process. There’s no legitimate reason whatsoever to rush an unfair process in Kosovo.”
I would agree that there was hardly a rush, but these countries are not really comperable to Kosovo. NI has a Unionist majority and this has never been questioned by any of the parties involved, and thus NI rightly remains part of the UK. But Kosovo does indeed have an Albanian majority wanting to be independent…this alone is a considerable case for secession from Serbia, at least under international law anyway. As for Ireland, they are there many years and I still see no reason to question our own state’s motives in this case (unlike everything else). And some of the other non-axe states you mention have their own seccession issues e.g. Spain, a cobbled-together country if ever there was one. To be honest, I think that the US and the EU have decided to make the best of a bad situation and see Kosovo gone from Serbia - I dont see any underhanded motives. How the Serbs can expect to govern a province in which (a) there is an Albanian majority wanting out and (b) they carried out ethnic cleansing is just beyond me.
March 22nd, 2008 at 8:55 pm
There is no doubt that it is a precedent, especially considering the post-Cold War era we are living in. Rather than comparing apples with oranges: Kosovo - Bangladesh, why not Kosovo - Kurdistan?
The only real question is how long? There was a recent comment piece in the british guardian newpaper by the advocacy organization the International Crisis Group declaring that ‘independence’ has been a great success and look, no one is killing each other in the immediate aftermath. Then again, leafing through the CVs of those employed by the ICG, it is hardly surprising to see that there are very few people with solid academic qualifications in the fields that they provide expertise/consultancy in.
Well, one month after President Wilson introduced the notion of ’self-determination’, there was neither an upswing in large scale killings. It took much longer and sowed the seeds for the further collapse of the European Empires and their colonies. I would suggest a time scale of 10 years plus, by which time global economic power and influence will have further shifted to the East. We won’t like that.
What’s to stop, say, the Chinese from deciding that California is independent of the United States and that Texas should be reincorporated into Mexico? They can point to Kosovo to say, ‘the West decided that United Nations resolutions on the fundamental integrity of the sovereign state and the Helsinki Final Act, are optional’. I suppose at that point we could nuke the Chinese of course (not difficult to imagine considering the growth of anti-Chinese hysteria in the West).
The UN has simply been emasculated by the Western powers. It was useful during the Cold War as a balancing medium, but post 1989, left a weak Russia still with veto powers. Now that is clearly unfair. The UNs role in the former Yugoslavia was systematically undermined with the help of insiders (i.e. the dirty story of how Boutrosx2 Ghali did not get relected and his deputy Annan got the job). Monitoring of elections was wrested away from the UN in 1994(?) and taken over by the ever more ‘managable’ OSCE who have legitimized quite a number of bent elections since (i.e. that the right bastards won, starting with Yeltsin’s 1996 elections).
Two things have been learnt from non-Western countries about the West since 1989, 1: you cannot trust them; 2: You have to have significant military potential (nukes) to protect your sovereignty (hence the popularity of nuclear weapons techonology as sold globally by US ally Pakistan (Mr. Khan)). Add to this that is was also the West who were first to drop ‘no fisrt use of nukes’ and one has to ask, has Western leadership since 1989 really been that good or brought considerable improvements to the protection of its citizens? It’s a bit too late now….
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:08 pm
Hi Aleks
I would of course agree it is a precedent and no doubt a dangerous enough one. But think of it from a simplisitic point of view -perhaps the US and EU simply decided that Serbia governing Kosovo is not going to work, and why not change it now? Why wait for years?
In any case, Happy Easter everyone:-)
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:29 pm
How did the Albanians become a majority in Kosovo?
How long have they been a majority in Kosovo?
What’s the overall relationship of Serbia to Kosovo?
*****
“Independent” Kosvo isn’t truly independent, as per who will be calling most of the shots there in the present and likely distant future.
Moreover, the US, France, UK, Germany, Turkey and some others disrespect other disputed territories which either have a better or just as good a case for independence.
UNSCR 1244 is about a negotiating process within the framework of Serbia. Instead, some outside powers diplomatically spoiled the Albanians by backing their independence claims without fair consideration given to the Serb view.
It’s pleasing to see that not all EU members are united on this. Ditto countries in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and many other nations.
The compromise is to have Kosovo in the UN as an irrevocably autonomus part of Serbia (noting the precedent of Soviet era Ukraine and Belarus). In addition and with the previously mentioned in mind, Kosovo can have IOC membership like non-nations Hong Kong, Puerto Rico and the British Virgin Islands.
Really, who is being the more mature on this? Serbia should’ve none of its rights considered in a settlement? I don’t think so.
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:35 pm
Russia has been accused of fuckups both real and exaggerated. The US has had its share. Former Yugoslavia is a glaring case in point.
The Clinton administration encouraged the Izetbegovic regime to not sign onto the Vance-Owen settlement plan of 1992. This contributed to a few more years of fighting and the Dayton Accord which pretty much mirrors the Vance-0wen agreement.
At Rambouillet, the Clinton adminisdtration attempted to get the Serbs to sign a diktat leading to Kosovo’s independence. When the Serbs rightfully refused, the Clinton administration led NATO bombed Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the benefit of the crime ridden KLA.
On disputed former Communist bloc territories, Russia has the more objective stance.
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:38 pm
That’s: administration.
The cavalier attitude of fucking around with someone else’s country isn’t a healthy global sign. It contradicts the idea of seeking a better global understanding.
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:48 pm
Cheers!
Indeed, but who knows how all this will unravel? Since 1989 the world has been remaking itself. Some things changed quickly, some more slowly. I certainly don’t have any answers.
I think the real strategic argument is that by making Serbia smaller/weaker, it is easier to manage, i.e. exactly the same policy that Tito employed and the Serbs accepted. Of course, you can’t just say that in public, hence all the ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ talk which is certainly much easier to swallow with large doses of massively exaggerated or fabricated war crimes.
What we are told is that staying in Serbia is impossible, but unfortunately we are not told how it would function as an stable, ‘independent’ state. We’ve only had assurances that the powers that be know what they are doing and very little in the way of evidence (like Iraq etc.). What is certain is that Serbia will remain unstable and divided for quite a while while which will not bring stability to south east europe.
If the ‘pro-western’ parties as the popular nomenclatures would have us call them win the upcoming elections with a slim majority, do they have the right to make substantial policies to which slightly less of the population is opposed, and in a state where coalition is the form of government? As for Kosovo, some ‘expert’ commentators have expressed surprise about the Macedonian government being on the brink of collapse.
There are still too many unpredicable factors in play.
The recent violence in Kosovo (17 March raid by UNMIK to ‘take back’ the court house) shows how easily things can spiral out of control which already contradicts the main argument of independantists, independence = stability. It’s hardly mature politics to go from it can’t go back, so anything else is better. The real tragedy is that the average albanian is still getting shafted, except far more by their own ‘politicians’, hence the 40% who didn’t come out and vote in the recent Kosovo legislature elections. Poor sods.
I point I forgot to make in my initial post (and comment on by others elsewhere in the ether) is that why on earth would countries in conflict trust the UN if ‘peace keeping’ forces ultimately become armies of occupation? Add that to the UN Opt-out system that currently exists and the UN is dead as we know it. It makes it a lot harder for the UN to help the undefended or provide critical supplies to refugees.
Add to this the massive growth in semi-transparent NGOs with certain agendas to push and the expanded use of PR and lobbying to sell ‘humanitarian interventions’ etc. and we see journalists are now effectively considered as the propaganda arms of their respective nations governements and hence are being killed in much greater numbers than ever before. Where does that leave us with actual and reliable information?
Sorry for being such a cynical sod.
Back to the question in hand, its evident that ‘independence’ is ‘dependence’ and actually pointless, as were the Balkan wars. As barriers between european states were being brought down, new barriers in the Balkans went up. In whose interests were they? ‘Independence’ puts up barriers which is contrary to the ideal of the EU. It’s ridiculous. It just means that the poor remain poor for longer, hardly the best way to combat everything from organized crime to gender equality.
How is it that the great democratic nations of the USA and Europe have and still do make a pigs ear of the region? ‘Helpful’ meddling has only caused more death and distruction… I kind of see why the Chinese are so anal about sovereignty…
March 22nd, 2008 at 9:59 pm
Mike,
One can go on about who is the majority in Kosovo but I think that this is not really essential. It’s best to focus on whether those that claim to represent the Albanians in Kosovo do and whether they improve the lot of the average albanian. When the Albanians had the upper hand until 1989, they abused their position without fear of sanction. Now, 55% of albanians (I made a mistake above, only about 45% voted) did not vote in the elections. Well why not? We’ve been constantly told how all of them think the same. Could it be that all the main parties who have essentially the same policies did not offer them anything credible? Many promises have been made, very few kept.
My worry is that if nothing improves within a couple of years, the majority will turn on the politicians (maybe each other), and the politicians will, in time honored fashion, create a new enemy to ‘unite’ their subjects, whether it be in Presevo valley, Montenegro or Macedonia. Either way, the promised ’stability’ that independence was supposed to deliver will be proved to have been hollow politiking of the ‘do something’ brigade. Still, the EU can continue to throw money at the region, just like Tito did and probably with the same level of success.
March 22nd, 2008 at 10:01 pm
Here’s something for you to puke on:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/910syuxh.asp
The Radical Party isn’t more “nationalist” than the repackaged KLA.
Serbia minus Kosovo is noticeably more multi-ethnically tolerant and democratic than the repackaged KLA in Pristina.
The stated lack of recent KLA violence stems from Kosovo being very much ethnnically cleansed of non-Albanians. For the moment, KFOR and the repackaged KLA are smart enough to not lean too heavy on the mostly Serb inhabited area of Mitrovica.
Once again, Kosovo is socio-economically downtrodden with a Western force calling most of the shots. If this continues, it’s a recipe for further turmoil. Some will no doubt blame Moscow and Belgrade for this.
March 22nd, 2008 at 10:08 pm
Aleks
They’re the ones using the demographics as an issue. I’m replying to it by noting how the current status came about.
Given the circumstances, it’s way too simplistic to say that just because an area suddenly changes in ethnicity, it has a right to secede.
In Pridnestrovie, this argument has more legitimacy given the history between Pridnestrovie and Moldova, which isn’t as intertwined as Serbia with Kosovo. Also in consideration is Pridnestrovie’s better record at self governance, human rights and multi-ethnic harmony.
It’s quite telling how the pro-Koosvo independence side either ignores UNSCR 1244 or misrepresents it.
March 22nd, 2008 at 10:28 pm
Honorable mention:
http://www.takimag.com/info/about/
It’s one thing to say something isn’t in Western interests, thereby making sense for the West to take a given stand. However, there’re clear indications that’s what sometimes advocated isn’t in the West’s best interests.
At a relatively high profile venue, someone stated what I’d said awhile back about the advocacy to communicate from the position of the West’s best interests, rather than giving the impression of being anti-West.
Peter Rodman, Lawrence Eagleburger, Ruth Wedgwood, Lewis MacKenzie, James Bissette and several others opposed to Kosovo’s independence aren’t anti-West. The neolib Sorosians and neocons shouldn’t be presented as being the sole foreign policy interest reflecting the West on former Communist bloc issues.
March