http://www.textbookx.com/product_detail.php?upc=9780306810367&type=book&affiliate=froogle

an additional aside concerning the sovs and imp. japan:
the military historian, bruce lee, wrote a book titled “marching orders”, dealing with declassified (as of 1995) info about the u.s. codebreaking of japan’s ciphers.
iirc, a major point was that after kholkhin-gol there was a detente until 41. stalin originally was seeking a non-aggression pact with japan, particularly after barbarossa began. the japanese never signed a pact with the sovs, even after barbarossa began.
this mutual detente allowed the sovs to ship their siberian troops to moscow for the 41 winter counterattack, since by then the japanese were wrapped up in the pacific campaign.
sometime after midway and guadalcanal, it was the JAPANESE who were pressing the sovs for a formal non-aggression treaty. the sovs stalled and delayed, never agreeing until they eventually attacked japan.
strongly recommend the book; it’s a fascinating new viewpoint.

The Red Army not only took Manchuria which they passed on to Mao Zedong, they also took Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands which Japan is still asking for the return of. Stalin also planned to land troops on Hokkaidō two months before the scheduled American landings in Kyushu.

If Japan had not surrendered, all of Korea would have been Communist and half of Japan would have been occupied probably for the same length of time as Germany.

It is probably fair to say that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined with the Soviet declaration of war and August Storm made it clear to the Japanese that further resistance was futile.

There is another reason this battle was very important. While exact details of the battle were not known in the west, the general story that the Japanese were defeated by the Soviets was known. And this was probably studied by the military commands in the western countries because the USSR and Germany had a pack and Germany had just embarked upon WW2. The USSR would have been considered a foe at that time. They did study the USSR-Finland war, and a study of that war would have shown the Soviets to be rather deficeint.

Now lets jump ahead 2 years. Germany invades the USSR and causes staggering loses. Well, Germany was already known to be a deadly opponent, but the Soviet failures showed that the USSR was very much inferior militarily to Germany on the field in 1941. Add in the Finland war and the poor Soviet showing there, considering, and then think back to Khalkhin Gol where the Soviets defeated the Japanese.

Which brings me to that other reason this battle had such influence. The western nations would have looked at Japan in 1941 as the country beaten by the Soviets, who themselves were thought to be on the verge of losing to Germany. The west would of not considered the Soviet military as very competent at that point, so a Japanese military that was defeated by the Soviets would have been thought of as a rather impotent threat. In histories about the first 6 months of the Pacific war, much has been made about how completely the west underestimated the ability of the Japanese. It is my belief that the Japanese defeat at Khalkhin Gol convinced the western powers that they did not need to reinforce their eastern colonies to a much greater extent or make this region an urgent matter. They probably thought the Japanese would not be up to conquering their forces. At least not before reinforcements could be deployed. So the Japanese defeat at Khalkhin Gol lulled the west into thinking Japan would not be much of a threat and neglected reinforcing their colonial forces because of this impression of Japanese incompetence.

I would like to point out one factual error you made. You stated that “Zhukov had amassed a force of more than 50,000 men, 498 tanks and 250 planes. Matched against him was a similarly sized, but not well armoured Japanese force.” Actually, the Japanese force was around 30,000 men, with only 73 tanks, far fewer than the Soviet’s forces.

Also, the Japanese tanks were primarily medium and light tanks, with 57mm short barrel guns intended on infantry support and taking out MG positions. While most (80%) of the Soviet tanks were light tanks, their main weapon was a log barrel 45mm cannon which had a longer range than the Japanese tanks, and could penetrate the Japanese Type 89 medium tank’s armor.

It would not be until late 1941 that the Japanese Type 97 medium tank would be equipped with a 47mm high velocity cannon, designed for anti-tank use. However, the Japanese would still rely on medium and light tanks for most of the war. They didn’t build a heavy tank until late 1944, and it would never see significant combat duty.

More than anything, this battle showed that the Japanese armored forces were not up to the same level of military might that their naval and air forces were. This would be a reoccurring theme throughout WWII. The Japanese did not capitalize on the German attacks on the Soviets not because of any lessons about the Soviet military, but because of the lessons of the weaknesses of their own armored units.

“There is an overlooked but very important consequence of Khalkhin Gol, it propelled Zhukov to the top.”

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When compared to the Soviet-Finnish war (which occurred at roughly the same time), the Red Army did much better against a stronger Japanese foe.

Being farther away from Moscow probably spared the Red Army’s far eastern flank the brunt of the Stalin’s purge of the officer corps. There’s also the view that at the time, the USSR’s best ground personnel were located in the far east, as a pre-planned defense against a possible Japanese attack. The 1905 Russo-Japanese War wasn’t that long ago and during the Russian Civil war, the Japanese showed signs of desiring Russian territory. Simple common sense acknowledged a sparsely Soviet populated far east, thereby requiring a strong military presence to counter a hypothetical Japanese attack. Another factor in the performance differential was perhaps Stalin taking the Finns for granted unlike the militarily stronger Japanese.

Good to see this subject covered Andy. On the characerization of Russia being “decisively defeated” in 1905, keep in mind that it was the Japanese who were seeking a settlement. This is because they knew that their war chest was running out. The Japanese complaint of being robbed “the fruits oif victory” overlooks this point. Tokyo benefitted from surprise attack, geography and world symnpathy on their side. At the time of the Japanese attack, the major powers took glee at seeing Russian influence in Asia challenged. At the time of the surprise 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many Russians remembered the American reply to the surprise 1904 Japanese attack on Port Arthur.