They probably would have liked to keep the pressure on Georgia (or, to be more precise, the current Georgian government), and the best way to do that would have been to maintain the instability in the Caucasus. But, on the other hand, domestic pressure to recognise the two states was immense, and every leader needs to keep a close eye on the domestic mood.

The biggest downside for Russia in recognising A & SO is, as we have both noted, that it paves Georgia’s way into NATO.

But I think that there are some pretty big pluses for Russia that will come out of their decision to grant recognition.
Firstly, they’ll either get extra territory or two vassal states. Secondly, security in the Caucasus will probably be enhanced in the long term which I think is actually of benefit to both Russia and Georgia (although perhaps not quite the result that the Kremlin was actually seeking).

And, who knows, maybe the hammer blow of losing A & SO will bring about a regime change in Georgia anyway, which would suit Russia just fine…

(Gosh, aren’t we all getting cynical these days?)

I agree with you that this could eventually ease the way to Georgia making the pragmatic decision to abandon their claims over these provinces in favour of a settled border and joining NATO.

For that very reason though, wouldn’t it have been strategically smarter for Russia to not recognise their independence and kept them simmering over as rebellious provinces within Georgia? Ie. restore the status quo after a short, sharp show of strength and continue to undermine Georgian territorial integrity.

Of course this assumes (1) that Russia’s goal is indeed to keep Georgia out of NATO and (2) that Georgia would indeed have eventually accepted A & SO’s independence as the price of joining NATO.

I should add before anyone starts hyperventilating – I’m not at all saying I support that sort of cynical policy-making, only that it seems like the sort of calculus which probably is in play.

“How do you invade your own country?”

I think the concept of ‘your own country’ is a rather moot point in situations such as these, where one group of people wants a chunk of land to be either independent or to be a part of one country, and another group of people wants that same chunk of land to be a part of their country.

“Are telling me, you recognize this tiny minority as an independent state?”

Personally, no. The chances of such a small state being viable are slim to none. Eventually they’ll more than likely be absorbed into Russia.

“Abkhazia ethnically cleansed 200,000 Georgians from “Abkhazia” with the help of the Russians. Now, Abkhazia says, hey, we are in the majority, so give us an independent nation.”

I’m a big believer in looking at the facts on the ground. There is virtually no chance that Georgians could re-settle Abkhazia without further bloodshed over the next decade or two. For the sake of the lives of both Abkhazians and Georgians in the area, it’s probably best that no such attempt is made. A better option for the medium term security of these two territories is to remain separate from Georgia, morally distateful as that may seem.

These regimes are puppets of the Kremlin.

Yes. And they’re largely run by criminals too. They aren’t nice, but they are the men in power, and have the support of their people – much as you or I might dislike this.

Georgia represents a bright light in a cloud of darkness that has descended on Russia since Putin took office.

I firmly agree. Georgia is still far from perfect, but it is struggling towards democracy. We should encourage and defend this. However, the current Georgian government has made it very difficult to do this.

Saakashvili has also undermined his own domestic support, and this is likely to give his opponents a political opportunity. How domestic political developments play out over the next year or so will tell us a lot about how far Georgia is along the road to democracy.

The sham election of Medvedev is proof that Russia has a tyrannical government and is harassing its neighbors. Why you can’t see this, I don’t know.

Again, I agree. If you check back through my archives, you’ll see that before the election I referred to Medvedev as “Putin’s Poodle”. I’ve been consistent in criticising the state of Russian democracy for years.

Perhaps you do not have access to Western Media.

I live in London (Moscow on the Thames) and so probably have access to a freer media than most to the West of me. Sorry – couldn’t resist

The Kosovo argument is a false argument.
Georgia has a population of 4 million. Southern Ossetia has a population of 60,000. 40,000 are Ossetians. Are telling me, you recognize this tiny minority as an independent state? Kosovo population in 90% Albanian an represents over 1 million people. Ossetians carry Russian passports only because Russia was giving them out. A Russian in Moscow has to wait three to four months to get a Russian passport. Ossetians were getting passports in a days. Why the difference? Was Putin up to something? Perhaps?

Abkhazians are in the majority so they should have an independent country if they want, right? Wrong. Abkhazia ethnically cleansed 200,000 Georgians from “Abkhazia” with the help of the Russians. Now, Abkhazia says, hey, we are in the majority, so give us an independent nation. Recently, Russia sent transportation troops to rebuild the Abkhazian railroad. It turns out these troops were really Russian special forces, armed to the teeth.

These regimes are puppets of the Kremlin. They are part of a grand plan to regain control of the ex Soviet republics. Divide and conquer if you will. Georgia represents a bright light in a cloud of darkness that has descended on Russia since Putin took office. The sham election of Medvedev is proof that Russia has a tyrannical government and is harassing its neighbors. Why you can’t see this, I don’t know. Perhaps you do not have access to Western Media. I was in Russia a month ago and it was totally 100% propaganda.

The Georgian operation was planned since April when Saakashvili agreed to a road map to join Nato. Russia will never let that happen. Saakashvili was doing all he could to defend his country. I don’t think he thought Russia would venture as far as it did. Apparently, Putin did not either. See article.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d9009a6-7851-11dd-acc3-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1.

I appreciate your openness and earnest response. I just believe you need to do more research. Russia is in the wrong. Georgia needs to be defended.

Firstly, there is a big difference between starting a conflict, and starting a war. Russia/South Ossetia started the former, Georgia started the latter with it’s full scale invasion of South Ossetia. True, Russia also didn’t have to react the way it did, with a counter-invasion, and should have restrained itself. Equally, it shouldn’t have launched such large scale provocations.

Just to clarify – I didn’t at any stage say that Russia was right to attack Georgia. Just that Georgia was stupid to send its troops into South Ossetia. Sometimes, when you know you’re going to take a kicking, picking a fight with a muscle bound moron isn’t a great idea. Even when your neighbour is threatening you. Sometimes, you just have to cut your losses.

Secondly, when referring to whether Russia was right to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I wasn’t considering the moral aspect of the decision. I was thinking about whether Russia made the right choice for itself, given the geopolitical implications. Long time readers of Siberian Light will know that I take a ‘Realist’ approach to the theory of International Relations, but I could have made that clearer in the post above. I fully take your point that not every disgruntled ethnic group should get independence (it’s a dangerous long term strategy for any state to pursue) but, from Russia’s perspective, it currently has more to gain from a few ethnic groups achieving independence (previous S Ossetia and Abkhazia) and today ‘micro-states’ like Trans-Dneister. The question is, will the short term benefits of this to Russia outweigh the longer term instability that joining the US in promoting ethnic succession (think Kosovo) will cause.

Thirdly, I fully agree that Russia wants to bring about regime change in Georgia. Sadly, Saakashvili has played into Putin’s hands with his ill-considered assault on South Ossetia.

Finally, I suggest that you take a look through the back archives of Siberian Light before saying that I follow the Kremlin line. When Russia does something right, I’ll praise it. When it does something wrong, I’ll criticise it. Usually, at the moment, the current Russian government seems to be doing something wrong.

South Ossetia has a microscopic population of 60,000. If every disgruntled minority group of that size in the world justifies a massive foreign invasion and de-facto annexation, watch out. Few borders on Earth are so perfectly drawn along ethnic lines. Russia’s own are certainly not.

Before you blog, you ought to at least educate yourself instead of posting untruthful diarrhea all over the internet. First, it was Russia, which instigated the war using the Southern Ossetian Bandits as bait. Please read Michael Totten’s report,http://www.michaeltotten.com/ the August 26th article, which squarely lays the blame on Russia.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia are Georgian territories, more so than Dagestan and Chechnya are Russian territories. Georgian did not invade a sovereign nation. Georgia sent troops into a an unruly province of its own country. Russia invaded Georgia. Russia bombed Georgian cities. Russia occupied cities like Poti and sank ships. Why Poti? Poti was hundreds of miles away from the conflict.

I’ll tell you why. You might be too thick headed to understand. Putin wants to control the flow of oil in Russia’s backyard. The Georgian pipeline is not under his control. Putin has to bring about regime change in Georgia to get control of the pipeline. That is what this whole conflict is about. You can side with Putin or you can side with the Free world. I am siding with the Free world.

Robert

“A Europe in which we would accept the right of Russia to intervene in any country where there are holders of Russian passports – or the right of any other nation to intervene in the same way – would be a Europe sinking down again in the chaos and conflicts of the past.

“That’s why this conflict now is not only about South Ossetia and Georgia – it is about principles fundamental to the peace and stability of all of Europe. And the defence of these principles should be the duty of each and every one of us.”

http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2008/08/09/the-principles-at-stake/

I agree to an extent – Georgia is still unpredictable. And it may well be that the internal political ramifications – Saakashvili is, in my view, doomed in the longer term – lead to the arrival of a government with grand ambitions.

But I think that it’s more likely that Georgia has now (a) had a big shock to the system, which will make everyone involved in Georgian politics sit back and think about what is really important to them, and (b) been gifted an opportunity to forget about South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While their status was stil unclear, any Georgian government was honour bound to try to bring them back into the fold by whatever means necessary. Now that they’ve obtained de facto independence, Georgian governments now have the excuse they need to abandon two restless provinces that can bring them nothing but trouble.

Good point about Adjaria though – I have no idea how things will play out there. I think they’re likely to remain a part of Georgia, because they are geographically separated from Russia, but the long term prospects there are very unclear.

With regard to Georgia not being geographically isolated from NATO, you’re absolutely right. That accidentally slipped into the final version of this post.

I do think that Georgia would be very difficult to defend though, through Turkey – as you say, a logistical nightmare. But, were Ukraine to also be a part of NATO, its defence would presumably be significantly easier. (Assuming, of course, that it’s NATO allies felt it was either necessary or politically desirable to physically defend Georgia!)

I enjoyed reading the post, but I have two comments:

1) You say “Georgia will eventually see sense and abandon its claim to its two provinces,” but I find that to be a bit too deterministic. I think it’s possible, and perhaps even likely after this war, but Saakashvili’s decision to “punch the little kid on the nose,” as you so vividly described it, indicates to me that Georgia seeing sense on something related to what it defines as its territorial integrity is by no means a guarantee. It may also define “sense,” quite a bit differently, as relinquishing Ossetia and Abkhazia might (admittedly this is a remote possibility, but one that is important for many Georgians) encourage an Adjarian breakaway attempt and encourage even more Russian intervention, this time on the south end of Georgia.
-and-
2) This is me nitpicking, but Georgia is not completely geographically isolated from NATO. It does in fact border on Turkey, which has been in NATO since 1952. Defending it would indeed be tricky, but not at all impossible, since NATO does control about half of the Black Sea’s coastline and airspace (which would become even more if Ukraine ever accedes). Furthermore, if Iraq (this being purely speculative on my part by the by, and not intended to indicate support for or opposition to the war there) turns out to have some sort of long-term American troop presence there akin to, say, Germany, even more NATO troops would be available for deployment, again through Turkey. This would be a logistical nightmare under current circumstances, but it could be made viable in the long term. Lastly, if it acceded, you could bet it would invite the construction of NATO military bases and the extension of the missile-defense project, though that latter could easily turn into Cuban Missile Crisis Round Two, in the sense that the American advance-silos in the 1960s were in, again, Turkey.