Every now and then, someone pops up and says that, for Russia the end is nigh: the oil boom is unsustainable, the population is falling, the Chinese are coming, the vodka will run out – that sort of thing.

But, if Russia actually did collapse, how would it happen? John O’Sullivan has put his thinking cap on, and come up with a fascinating ‘future-history’ of the decline and fall of Russia.

At its most basic level, O’Sullivan’s future history of Russia goes something like this:

• Oil prices collapse, and Russia gets poorer
• China grows in influence, particularly in the Russian Far East
• China and Russia trade nuclear warning shots, but pull back from all out war
• Russia breaks up into lots of mini-states

Of course, it’s fantasy, and there’s plenty of detail to argue about, but it’s entertaining fantasy (well, if you’re not Russian…!).

It also contains some truly intriguing scenarios for Russia’s future.

Nuclear Warning Shots

I was particularly fascinated by the concept that two nuclear powers, unwilling to engage in conventional conflict, might trade ‘nuclear warning shots’:

On Aug. 14, 2022, Russia fired “a tactical nuclear missile” into an uninhabited region of the Taklimakan Desert as a “warning to all who might harbour aggressive intentions towards Mother Russia.” The following day China fired five tactical nuclear missiles into uninhabited Russian regions of the Arctic. […]Both China and Russia, terrified by their own use of nuclear weapons, were happy to co-operate; neither wished to back down.

I can imagine this kind of strategy being applied quite effectively by and against countries with sizeable uninhabited, or perhaps sparsely inhabited areas. Not sure how the UK or France would fare in such a conflict, though…

I looked briefly into the strategy (such as it is) of nuclear war back in my university days, but don’t recall ever seeing this type of conflict discussed. Does anyone know if any work has been done in this area?

Subsidised Chinese migration

Some people are already speculating that China has a policy of encouraging migration to strategic Russian regions, but O’Sullivan’s future history takes this concept a step further:

By 2020 much of the [Far East] was Russian in name only. Ethnic Russian provincial governors, appointed by Moscow, ruled over a heterogeneous population of which Chinese migrants were the largest single component.

China now took a cautious but fateful step. It adopted a state policy of subsidizing Chinese migration into eastern Russia with grants.

O’Sullivan speculates that the Russian government would be so weakened that it wouldn’t be able to do anything to oppose this policy. I’m not sure that this is particularly realistic, but I wonder if Chinese policy wonks are taking note of this idea as an innovative future strategy?

The Far East Republic

Are Siberia and the Russian Far East a drain on Russia’s resources, or are they the engine room of the Russian economy. What would happen if the region were to break away from Mother Russia?

The Commander of Russia’s Far East Military District… proclaimed the establishment of the Far East Republic (DVR) under a provisional military government in Vladivostock, with independent internal and foreign policies.

China welcomed the division of Russia, calculating that the creation of a weak buffer state that would surely accept its fate as an obedient suzerain of the Middle Kingdom.

Alas, China’s ambitions were thwarted by a canny DVR government…

After “restoring order” at home, the DVR pursued the independent foreign policy it had announced, starting with the return of the Kurile Islands to Japan. Japan responded with diplomatic relations and a treaty of economic co-operation, and her lead was soon followed by the U.S., India and the West. Investment followed. Within a decade of the war’s end, the DVR was closer to the West and far more prosperous than it had been as a region within Russia. It was also a haven for Chinese democrats as well as migrant workers. China disliked all this. But since the DVR enjoyed the benefits of both the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its own stock of nuclear weapons inherited from Russia, there was little Beijing could do about it.

Again, somewhat optimistic, I think, especially as the collapse in oil prices was given as the primary reason for Russia’s collapse in the first place. But the decision to surrender the Kurile Islands to Japan is a great idea – guaranteed to win a powerful ally for this newly independent state.

There’s plenty more in O’Sullivan’s original article. Whether any of it will actually come to pass is very debateable, but it was certainly a fun read.

Chinese President Hu Jintao has arrived in Moscow for the first day of a three day state visit to Russia. So far, no real news, apart from the following, rather bland, statement that was handed (not even read out) to journalists shortly after his plane landed:

“I am certain this visit will give new momentum to the deepening of Russian-Chinese relations and to our practical cooperation in all spheres.”

Hu’s a media friendly leader, as you can tell.

As the trip develops, energy and trade are sure to be on the agenda, and I’d imagine that, when Putin and Hu meet, they’ll spend a fair amount of time discussing the state of the word today, and how they can enhance their respective positions.

I wonder if they’ll also discuss the flow of Chinese migrants to Siberia and Russia’s Far East?

It looks as though Russia may be becoming isolated over it’s position on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. An anonymous (it’s a pre-requisite for employment in Brussels these days) EU official told the Guardian:

“The Chinese are very, very constructive and on board with the US-European position,” one official said.

At the same time, though, Russia seems to be taking a slightly more pro-active role (perhaps because of China’s shift of position?) and has announced a new plan which it hopes will break the deadlock.

EU diplomats said discussions would focus on a Russian proposal that Iran transfer to Russia its uranium enrichment — a process that can be used to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

“The meeting will be to discuss the Russian initiative and to define conditions for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides,” one diplomat said.

A key stumbling block to the resumption of negotiations with the EU has been Tehran’s refusal to mothball the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, which produces a gas that, when enriched, can be used to make atomic reactor or weapons-grade fuel.

Under the Russian proposal, Iran would be allowed to continue to convert uranium ore at Isfahan provided it then shipped it to Russia for enrichment.

I’d imagine the EU negotiators will look seriously at Russia’s suggestion, as it does seem to offer a better route out of the impasse than any previous plans. I’m not sure what the US government will think, though. Not much, I’d imagine, as they seem to believe that an all or nothing approach is the only one that will pay dividends.

Whether this plan provides a solution or not, I’m pleased to see Russia becoming more constructively involved. Let’s face it, Russia and Iran have very close nuclear links and, without Russian support, any plan to convince Iran to abandon it’s nuclear ambitions will fail.

Looks like the the toxic waste that was spilled into the drinking water in the Chinese city of Harbin is spreading northwards along the Songhuar and Amur rivers. One Russian city has already announced plans to shut down its drinking water supply:

Oleg Mitvol, deputy head of the Russian environmental monitoring agency Rosprirodnadzor, told the BBC that in Khabarovsk “the water supply will be shut off, because the purifying equipment cannot deal with benzene”.

He said heating would not be affected but tap water would be cut for a few days and fish from the Amur would also be contaminated.

“We expect the spill to arrive in Russia on 26 November and in Khabarovsk on 30 November-1 December,” he said.

However, Chinese officials said they expected it to take two weeks to reach the Amur river.

I wonder whether the Russian government will press a claim for damages? (Update 25/11: Yes, if this senator is to be believed).

Now this is a meeting where I’d like to be a fly on the wall…

The chiefs of the CIS countries’ secret services gathered for a conference at the Livadia Palace in Yalta, the Crimea, for the 19th time on Friday. It was the first such event to have been attended by the top officials of German, Spanish, Italian and French intelligence services in the capacity of observers.

Alongside such traditional themes, as the struggle against terrorism, organized crime, drugs and human trafficking and illegal migration the participants discussed ways of preventing economic crimes with the use of advanced computer technologies, the chief of Ukraine’s Security Service, Igor Drizhchany told a news conference.

Fascinating choice of observers, too. Plenty of ‘friendly’ EU states, but no Brits, no Americans and, most important of all, perhaps, no sign of Russia’s SCO stablemate China.

For China and India to become involved in a joint military exercise with Russia is a pretty far-fetched idea at the moment, I’d say,, but Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, in India to observe a joint Russian-Indian military exercise, has been busy talking up the idea.

Russian-Indian-Chinese military exercises could be held in the future under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Interfax reported Sunday quoting the Defense Minister.

“In principle, this is possible. We’ve held military exercises and there is nothing unusual in this,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told journalists in Delhi on Sunday.

“The SCO [Shanghai Co-operation Organisation] was formed as an organization to deal with security issues and measures to ensure security,” he said.

[…]“While joining the SCO as an observer India was guided by its national interests. If this is so, India is drawn to this organization by the main aspects of its work, security being its central aspect,” the Russian defense minister said.

True, relations between the China and India have been gradually improving over the last decade or so, but they’ve been rising from a ridiculously low level, and have certainly not risen so much that they would wish to advertise their growing friendship by holding a joint military exercise - even if Russia is involved to make it look more multinational.

I think this is largely wishful thinking on the Russian part, an attempt to draw India further into the SCO - it currently only has observer status - in an attempt to balance the influence of China. The suggestion really does little more than show the Russia feels it is in a weak position in the SCO and feels that adding in a third large power would dampen somewhat the influence that China has in Central Asia.

[By the way, I’ve chosen this Mosnews article to highlight the story, as it is one of the laziest pieces of reporting I’ve seen for quite a while. You’ll note that they quote an Interfax article, and I guess that it is ok in a sense to quote quite extensively from them. But, in this piece, Mosnews have lifted the entire text of two Interfax articles (here, and here)and reprinted them almost verbatim. The only extra value they’ve added is two paragraphs at the end giving a little context (which I’d imagine they’ve lifted from another earlier article). Based on this evidence, they’re even worse than bloggers - at least we usually only excerpt sections of an article, and we tend to give back at least a little added value in terms of anaysis. OK, Sunday morning rant over, and now back to your normal scheduled programming.]

A few years ago the Turkish government had to close the Bosphorus Straits to allow through a rusting ex-Soviet aircraft carrier.  The Ukrainian government of the time had sold it to China.  Allaying the concerns of many in the West, the Chinese importers told the world that the carrier was nothing more than a decrepit old hulk, and that it was destined to become a floating casino.

So, how come ithe Varyag has just been painted in the colours of the Chinese navy?

In the latest developments, images show that workers at the Chinese
Dalian Shipyard have repainted the ex-Russian Kuznetsov-class aircraft
carrier Varyag with the markings and color scheme of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN), JDW reported.

Additional
new photographs show that other work, the specifics of which could not
be determined, appears to be continuing and that the condition of the
vessel is being improved.

According to RIA Novosti, from tomorrow Chinese tourists will no longer need visas when they visit Russia on an organised tour.

According to Shengeliya, 1.7 million Russians visited China in 2004, while 800,000 Chinese arrived in Russia, no more than 200,000 of them for tourist purposes. Russia could host up to one million Chinese tourists in 2006.

The interstate agreement stipulates tough regulations for the registration of a tour and provides for 30-day, visa-free stay in the country.

I think the key here is that tour companies will be the ones to face tough regulations to get permits, a process which should take away a lot of hassle from the average Chinese tourist and may well encourage increased levels of tourism from the ever-growing Chinese tour market.  Theoretically, this will also prevent significant abuse of the system by Chinese wishing to live illegally in Siberia and the Far East - a major concern among the Russian public and government.  Whether this will be the case, though, we’ll have to wait and see.

Still, yet another sign of the increasingly close relationship between Russia and China… 

A joint Chinese-Russian military exercise is underway in the Russian Far East, the first between the two countries.  10,000 personnel are involved in an operation that is said to be one of humanitarian assistance:

[T]he scenario for these exercises - aid to a state suffering political violence - isn’t aimed against any specific country.

However, the way in which Russia and China envisage providing this assistance is seen by many as somewhat provocative, to say the least:

Marines will storm beaches, to be joined by paratroopers in a mock invasion of an imaginary country.

So, is it provocative?  Well, let’s take a charitable look at the operation first.

Several humanitarian assistance operations have required robust military action in recent years, including on occasion actually landing marines on a beach (remember the fanfare as US marines stormed ashore in Somalia in the 1990s?) or potentially invading a country (a huge amount of planning was put in place for a potential invasion of Yugoslavia to protect Kosovo, for example). 

And Russia and China both have on their doorsteps a number of basket-case countries that could potentially require a robust intervention.  The most obvious candidate is North Korea which, if it collapses dramatically, may require a speedy response to secure a number of key military and nuclear sites - not to mention the rapid response that would be required to prevent a humanitarian disaster if refugees attempt to flee across the Chinese and Russian borders.  It’s fair to say that, if Russia and/or China needed to launch a military mission into North Korea, it would likely involve operations by both marines and paratroopers.

Central Asia is also a cause for concern to both Russia and China.  A civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s killed more than 50,000 and Russian peacekeepers intervened in response, setting a precedent for Russian-led peacekeeping missions in the region.  Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan all look relatively unstable at the moment, and given the perceived strength of Islamic extremism in the area, an interventionist response is likely to be strongly considered in the event of any conflict.  It’s unlikely that Russian or Chinese troops would be welcomed with open arms by all sections of the population (exactly as the US/NATO operation wasn’t warmly welcomed by all in Afghanistan), and any operation there would need to be prepared for a fight.

So, on the surface at least, there is a clear humanitarian justification for the wargames, and we shouldn’t discount it entirely.  It is certainly at least a part of the motivation of both China and Russia.

But the wargames begin to take on an entirely different, more threatening meaning when you consider that just across the sea from China is Taiwan, when you consider the menacing noises that the Chinese government and military have been making recently, and when you consider that an invasion is thought to be the most likely way that China could repossess its errant territory.

China holds similar exercises on its own fairly regularly, so an exercise of this type isn’t that much out of the ordinary for the Chinese military.  It becomes a different matter, though, because Russia is involved.  The Chinese military in particular will be hoping to get a number of tactical ideas from their Russian counterparts that they can use to enhance their chances of successfully invading Taiwan.  They’ll also be keeping a close eye on Russia’s military hardware, to see how it performs in comparison to their own.  They’ll be noting any deficiences and then deciding whether to further develop their own hardware, or to buy off the shelf from Russia.   

For Russia, the military benefits are relatively small.  They will, of course, gain from co-operation with Chinese troops, and will surely pick up a few tactical ideas.  But, let’s face it, Russia doesn’t have any particular plans to send its marines storming up a beach in the near future.  For Russia, the key practical objective here will be to promote its military hardware, with a view to increasing sales to one of its biggest customers.  Chinese observers are very unlikely to see a horde of Russian conscripts running around - instead they’ll see some of Russia’s best trained servicemen operating some of their latest high-tech weaponry. 

Geopolitical considerations are also important to this exercise, although less important than the practical Russian and Chinese aims that I’ve outlined above.  The two countries have an increasingly close, although still edgy relationship.  Any kind of operation like this allows them to develop a closer working relationship and, more importantly, gives an outward show of co-operation to the rest of the world.  This show is particularly directed at the United States.  From China’s perspective, they will want to give the impression that, should they invade Taiwan, they have at least one major ally.  Additionally, both countries will want to demonstrate that they are able to provide at least some kind of counterbalance to American dominance in the world, and that together they provide at least one of the poles of a multi-polar world.

So, what do we have?  A complex military exercise with multi-layered objectives, and a large number of justifications.  China will benefit more from the exercise than Russia and is, I think, rapidly becoming the senior partner in this relationship - although just how long Russia will be content to remain a junior partner is less sure.  There are plenty of internal tensions which will probably pull their relationship apart over time but, right now, we have a hybrid dragon-bear forcefully telling the world at large that it is a major player.

Liu Jianchao, a spokesman from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, has reportedly said that China will "seriously consider" sending troops to Kyrgyzstan, RIA Novosti reports today.  The same report though goes on to say that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has issued no official comment.

The Chinese comment follows a statement from Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan’s acting President, saying that he would agree to the deployment of troops from both the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (of which Russia and China are members) as well as troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (of which Russia is a member, but China is not).

If true, this would mark a major (and I mean seismic) shift in Chinese foreign policy as, other than the odd minor contribution to a UN peacekeeping mission, China hasn’t deployed it’s troops abroad for many a year (since the Korean War, I believe). 

I’m somewhat sceptical that China will actually send troops to Kyrgyzstan, given the lack of precedent and the lack of any immediate security threat for China to face in Kyrgyzstan.  However, it has to be said that Kyrgyzstan would be a relatively benign environment for China to experiment with a policy shift, so I wouldn’t rule it out entirely. 

Update: Interfax has a quote from the Chinese Foreign Ministry - they’ve denied the story:

In response to a question from Interfax, a ministry spokesman said: "As you know, the SCO has never considered the question of setting up military bases."

Nathan at registan.net also notes that although China is unlikely to send troops to Kyrgyzstan, the decision of the Kyrgyz government to cosy up to China is not only unexpected, but unwise:

I had seriously hoped that the new Kyrgyz government would shy away from cooperation with China. If I’m not mistaken, one of the public grievances of Kyrgyz protesters was that the government was giving the country away to China (probably an exaggeration based on ceding disputed territory in demarcation agreements).

Coming Anarchy also takes a look at the issue:

The US already has a base in Kyrgyzstan known as Manas Air Field and the Russians have one around 5 minutes away. Not only that, but they are considering opening a second. Looks like it might get pretty crowded there.

A couple of weeks ago, I mentioned in the Weekly News Roundup that China and Russia had postponed talks about their 2005 joint military exercise.  The explanation given at the time was ‘technical reasons’. 

According to Kommersant, the actual reason for the delay is that, instead of an anti-terrorist exercise as Russia had envisaged, China is trying to turn the exercise into a mock invasion and occupation of Taiwan.

[The exercise was] to take place on the Yellow Sea coast. Initially, the plan was to practice cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. However, Beijing changed the exercises format and it will look like the two armies occupying Taiwan. […]

The Russian have chosen Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region saying the region is very problematic and its nearness to the Central Asia. In fact, the Russian Headquarter wanted to use the Russian air base situated in Kyrgyzstan that Putin launched last year. It was used only once, during anti-terrorist exercises of the countries that are the members of the Collective Security Organization.

But Beijing refused. And offered another territory: Zhejiang. The Russians understood that was a trap. Taiwan is close to that region. The combined exercises would look very much provocative and they would make react not only Taiwan, but also United States and Japan. […]

At the suit of Russia, the location was changed. Now it is Chandong. But the Chinese tried to change the exercises format. Now they want to broaden the structure of the involved troops. They want to introduce the marines and combat ships: three big assault landing ships, a cruiser and a submarine. So it will look like they will be making a lodgement for occupation.

Although Russia has recently expressed its support for the One China policy, to actually participate in an exercise directed at Taiwan is a whole different matter, and one which Russia would be - very understandably - reluctant to involve itself in.  The repurcussions to Russia’s relationship with the United States would far outweigh any benefits to its relationship with China. 

Following the passing of  an anti-secession law by China directed at Taiwan, Russia has come out firmly on the side of China.

"The law outlines the key priority of the
Chinese government - peaceful methods of the country’s unification
within the framework of the ‘one state - two systems’ policy and
readiness to take maximum goodwill efforts for this purpose," the
Russian Foreign Ministry stressed.

"Russia adheres to the principled position on
this issue. There is only one China in the world with Taiwan being its
integral part. Therefore, we come out against Taiwan’s independence,"
the Foreign Ministry stressed.

Russia and China are often talked of as allies these days, and their ties probably closer than at any time in the last century.  But bear in mind that their relationship prior to the last few years has been abysmal.  Even while both were Communist regimes, they managed to find an excuse to fight a small border war. 

Today, each state sees the other as a strategic competitor.  Russia in particular is beginning to become seriously concerned about the growing economic strength of China relative to its own.  Their friendship today is about as superficial as it gets.

While Russia finds it politically expedient to offer China vocal support right now, expect the Kremlin to lose its voice if an actual conflict ever does erupt across the Taiwan Straits. 

While there is much hype about the increasingly close relationship between Russia and China, media coverage of Russo-Japanese relations tend to focus almost exclusively on the lack of a post-WW2 peace treaty between the two and the future of the Kurile Islands, which Russia currently controls but both states claim.

This NYT article, however, shows that, on a practical level, ties between Russia and Japan are far closer than we might think - perhaps closer even that Russia’s relationship with China on many levels:

Since 2001, there have been annual Japanese port calls to Vladivostok, home to Russia’s Pacific Fleet; there have been no port calls by the Chinese Navy.

Relations between admirals have "developed well on a personal level," a Japanese diplomat in Vladivostok said. Russian Navy cooperation is so close that the Pacific Fleet is discussing a joint commemoration with Japan of the May 27-28, 1905, Battle of Tsushima, in which Russia’s fleet was all but destroyed in the Korea Strait and which secured Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war.

Today, cooperation between the coast guards is equally close as both countries work to improve safety and reduce pollution and poaching in the Sea of Japan. Through October, a joint Russia-Japan effort to combat poaching netted the detention of 36 ships, compared with three during all of 2003, said Aleksandr Ivankov, deputy head of Russia’s border guards in the Vladivostok region.

Frankly, I think that Russia’s closeness to China is overhyped by scaremongers in the West who are looking for new bad guys, and by those in both Russia and China who want to talk up the importance of their respective nations on the world stage.  Sure, the two countries do have interests in common, but they will never be anything more than allies of convenience because each sees the other as a strategic competitor and a potential military threat. 

Japan, on the other hand, is neither a strategic nor a military competitor for Russia, which can only help the development of a close working relationship between the two.  Japan also shares Russia’s concern about the growing strength of China.  The issue of the Kuriles is, of course, an important one and neither Russia nor Japan will want to be seen to back down over them, but, when push comes to shove, they will not stand in the way of practical co-operation between the two

(Hat tip: American Future)