Russian President Vladimir Putin has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The International Center for Research on Biofuels and Patents in Zurich has chosen Putin for his alternative fuel initiatives in Russia.

The Swiss organisation says its main goal is to prevent future wars over oil.

The centre proposed Putin for his ideas on developing energies based on nanotechnology. It also praised the President for his efforts to reduce Russia’s reliance on fossil fuels.

Surely?

Russian television showed them entering a yurt, a tent used by Mongolian nomads, and touring the grounds of the Por-Bazhyn fortress, a clay labyrinth built more than 1,200 years ago when the region was ruled by the Uighurs, a Muslim, Turkic-speaking ethnic group.

Later Putin and the prince went rafting along the Yenisey River, news agencies reported.

It’s good to see that Putin has friends he can relax with.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has decided to pull an article from the next issue of the US-published Foreign Affairs journal.

“As a result of the excruciating and sluggish exchanges with the editors, the likes of which could only be found in diplomatic history, it was decided to give up trying to place Sergey Lavrov’s article in Foreign Affairs,” said a Foreign Ministry spokesman. 

Apparently, they were arguing over whether to include a sub-heading.  Foreign Affairs wanted to include one that implied that referred to the possibility of a new Cold War.  Lavrov didn’t. 

There’s a good overview of the spat at the New York Times (it’ll probably go behind a firewall soon, so read it quick), although Russophile rightly takes the NYT to task for some biased reporting towards the end of their ‘article’.  Foreign Affairs themselves have published their own take on the story on their website.

Anyway, following the spat, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to publish Lavrov’s “Containing Russia: Back to the Future” article on their website.

I’ve just read it and, to be honest, it’s a bit dull.  I’d have been disappointed if I paid for Foreign Affairs only to find this bland restatement of Russia’s position on International Politics.

Essentially, it restates Russia’s belief in the Westphalians system of international sovereignty, it’s belief in a system of international rules, that the US pursuit of an ideological crusade for democracy is destabilising, that it’s only natural that a country should take advantage of its competitive advantages (ie. in Russia’s case, energy) in the international marketplace, and that if we all work together we can solve all the world’s problems.

Joseph Nye (the soft power guy) offers up four reasons why Russia will not be a major power in 2020:

1. They are failing to diversify away from energy and develop a broad based economy rapidly enough. 
2. They need a rule of law that protects entrepreneurs and helps foster a middle class that will support a democratic market economy. 
3. They have a terrible situation in demography and public health, and have not invested in an adequate social safety net. 
4. Their current bullying attitudes in the energy area are destroying trust and undercutting their soft power in other countries.

I think he’s pretty much nailed it when it comes to identifying what Russia is doing wrong at the moment.  In particular, I like the way he has also identified particular structural strengths and weaknesses that Russia is either failing to take advantage of (energy wealth), or failing to take seriously enough (demography / health).

Having said that, though, I’m not sure that - even if the Russian government fails to find solutions to the problems that Nye identifies - Russia won’t still be a major power in 2020 (in the sense that it will have roughly the same impact on global and regional affairs that it enjoys today). 

2020 is only 13 years away and, unless there are some dramatic global shifts, energy is still going to be an important indicator of power in 2020.  I can’t see Russia losing its edge in that arena. (Nor, to be honest, do I see Russia losing its nuclear power, or its military edge over the majority of its neighbours).  

I can think of a number of (mainly Middle Eastern) oil-rich states that have kept going for years on the back of oil wealth, without addressing the underlying structural problems within their society and economy, and I see no reason why Russia can’t do the same.

The problem that Russia will face, of course, is the same one that every petro-state faces - keeping a population content is relatively easy while the money continues to flow in.  Keeping them happy when the money runs out is another matter altogether.  And, make no mistake - at some stage, the oil money will run out. 

Image courtesy of Waffler.  Thanks to Robert Amsterdam for first bringing Nye’s comments to my attention.  

A couple of scenarios could be in play. The first is that Putin has decided to gain hard cash by putting fissile material on the black market, which is not only insane but counterproductive. After all, Putin has his own insurgencies in the Caucasus, and the material could just as easily find its way there rather that against Putin’s enemies. The second possibility is even more frightening — which is that Russia has lost control over its nuclear materials and wants to keep the West from discovering it.

I think discarding the first option is pretty easy, too.  Putin has no need of hard cash - even if he is approaching retirement, he’s got plenty of far better ways to earn some ‘under the counter’ income.  And Russia as a country isn’t exactly scrabbling around for hard cash, floating as it does on a mighty lake of black gold.

The second option is far, far more plausible and, I think, the most likely option.  Nuclear security in Russia is lax- there simply is no denying it.  Bribery and corruption is endemic, and the people guarding nuclear material are - by and large - poor.  Beyond fear, they have very little incentive to turn down a bundle of thousand rouble notes in return for looking the other way. 

A quick Google search shows that nuclear material has been going missing from Russian stores for a decade or more.  A Guardian news story shows that Chechens might have some radioactive material. 

One final option that should be considered (even though its not one I personally subscribe to) is that the Russian government is deliberately making use of its arsenal of nuclear material to further its political agenda.  This could range from trying to strike fear into the hearts of rogue operatives, to intimidation of friendly (and not so friendly states) by hinting that a dirty bomb is a possibility, to simply trying to persuade Western donors to pay for the cleanup, disposal or security of nuclear material. 

Charlie Ganske at Russia Blog has a thoughtful post about whether Russia should focus its energies on maintaining a nuclear arsenal, or on preventing the breakup of the Motherland.

Today’s Washington Times features a story on Russia’s successful test of a maneuverable re-entry warhead. While this may bolster the national pride of Russian scientists and provide opponents of U.S. missile defenses with another talking point, the billions of rubles spent do nothing to address the real threats to Russia’s territorial integrity and security.

I think Charlie is right that the biggest threat to Russia right now is that of instability and militant Islam on it’s Southern borders - although I’m not sure that I’d go so far to suggest that Siberia may become China’s most northerly province. But I do think that he perhaps underestimates the benefits that nuclear weapons bring to Russia, and the relative cheapness of updating the nuclear arsenal compared with addressing deeper, more structural problems such as corruption in the military.

Spending money on addressing the structural problems that beset Russia’s convential military forces (”conventional”, “nuclear” - I feel like I’m back in the Cold War) is, without doubt, going to be of immense benefit to Russia. But restructuring the army is an expensive, and long term project. The problems of addressing corruption in society as a whole are going to be even more challenging. Spending money on nuclear weapons, on the other hand, is, comparatively cheap, and carries large short term benefits (or, to put that more precisely, avoids a great deal of short term damage).

I know it’s a cliche, but nuclear weapons really do carry cachet on the world stage. There is a belief among many states that nuclear power buys influence in global affairs. In the UK, where I live, updating our nuclear arsenal, small though it may be, has become a hot political topic. There are plenty for updating the arsenal, and plenty for turning our nuclear submarines into scrap, but the government seems convinced of the necessity to upgrade. I have no idea of the situation in France, but China is looking to boost it’s nuclear stockpile, and the US isn’t exactly neglecting nuclear research either. (And that’s before we even consider states like Israel, Iran and North Korea). These countries don’t spend all this money on nuclear bombs for fun - they spend it because they respect the nuclear arsenals of their competitors, and want to make sure that their arsenals are respsected also.

I personally don’t buy into their logic, but it is the logic that they use. And they are the people playing the game. It’s what they think that really matters in interstate relations.

One of the main reasons that Russia faces trouble on its borders is the general perception that it is a weak state - a belief shared not just by other states, but by disaffected groups within Russia itself. If Russia’s nuclear arsenal loses the respect of other states around the world, Russia loses respect (in the sense of fear, rather than love, of course) One that respect goes, so does a big chunk of what remains of Russia’s influence and bargaining power in the world. States hostile to Russia will take note of this, and feel emboldened to further provoke instability on and within Russia’s borders.

Although Russia does need to invest in long term projects to ensure its security, it also needs to spend a considerable amount of time, effort and, yes, money, on firefighting. It is hard to push the Cold War to the back of our minds, but perhaps in the early 21st Century, we would do better to look at Russia’s nuclear investments more as a defensive, rather than an agressive stance.

Now this is a meeting where I’d like to be a fly on the wall…

The chiefs of the CIS countries’ secret services gathered for a conference at the Livadia Palace in Yalta, the Crimea, for the 19th time on Friday. It was the first such event to have been attended by the top officials of German, Spanish, Italian and French intelligence services in the capacity of observers.

Alongside such traditional themes, as the struggle against terrorism, organized crime, drugs and human trafficking and illegal migration the participants discussed ways of preventing economic crimes with the use of advanced computer technologies, the chief of Ukraine’s Security Service, Igor Drizhchany told a news conference.

Fascinating choice of observers, too. Plenty of ‘friendly’ EU states, but no Brits, no Americans and, most important of all, perhaps, no sign of Russia’s SCO stablemate China.

OSCE delegates are considering a raft of Russian proposals to make the organisation ‘more effective.’  Russia effectively held a gun to the OSCE’s head a year ago, when it threatened to withold it’s budget contributions unless it’s proposals were taken seriously.

In particular, Russian diplomats want to force changes to the Office of Democratic Institutions (ODIHR), which monitors elections.  In particular, says RFE/RL:

Russia dislikes its custom of issuing a comment on elections soon after the polls close. In Russia’s view, ODIHR should submit its reports to the Permanent Council in Vienna and allow it to decide whether they should be published.

The Russian government is unhappy with the OSCE monitors, of course, because they tend to take a critical position on elections held in countries allied with Russia - countries which, to put it charitably, have a tendency to not hold free and fair elections.  Submitting reports to the Council for approval would, they hope, allow Russia to either moderate the content of election monitors’ reports or, at the very least, to delay their publication until well after the election in question, at a time when the news cycle has long since moved on.

Russia is a key member of the OSCE and, as such, has every right to make its demands heard.  The heavy handed way it has done so, however, has not won it any friends, and shows clearly how out of step Russia is with most other members states.*  The OSCE should, and I think will, reject these proposals.  If they reject them out of hand, so much the better.   

Nathan at registan.net has a couple of posts on the topic, including this typically forthright opinion:

At the very least, one would hope that the OSCE would grow a spine and tell Russia to quit acting like a spoiled crybaby.

*Although I’m critical of Russia’s heavy handed methods here, I am finding it hard to resist the temptations to draw parallels here with the way the United States has at times used the threat of witholding part of it’s UN dues in an attempt to prompt reform within that organisation.

A joint Chinese-Russian military exercise is underway in the Russian Far East, the first between the two countries.  10,000 personnel are involved in an operation that is said to be one of humanitarian assistance:

[T]he scenario for these exercises - aid to a state suffering political violence - isn’t aimed against any specific country.

However, the way in which Russia and China envisage providing this assistance is seen by many as somewhat provocative, to say the least:

Marines will storm beaches, to be joined by paratroopers in a mock invasion of an imaginary country.

So, is it provocative?  Well, let’s take a charitable look at the operation first.

Several humanitarian assistance operations have required robust military action in recent years, including on occasion actually landing marines on a beach (remember the fanfare as US marines stormed ashore in Somalia in the 1990s?) or potentially invading a country (a huge amount of planning was put in place for a potential invasion of Yugoslavia to protect Kosovo, for example). 

And Russia and China both have on their doorsteps a number of basket-case countries that could potentially require a robust intervention.  The most obvious candidate is North Korea which, if it collapses dramatically, may require a speedy response to secure a number of key military and nuclear sites - not to mention the rapid response that would be required to prevent a humanitarian disaster if refugees attempt to flee across the Chinese and Russian borders.  It’s fair to say that, if Russia and/or China needed to launch a military mission into North Korea, it would likely involve operations by both marines and paratroopers.

Central Asia is also a cause for concern to both Russia and China.  A civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s killed more than 50,000 and Russian peacekeepers intervened in response, setting a precedent for Russian-led peacekeeping missions in the region.  Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan all look relatively unstable at the moment, and given the perceived strength of Islamic extremism in the area, an interventionist response is likely to be strongly considered in the event of any conflict.  It’s unlikely that Russian or Chinese troops would be welcomed with open arms by all sections of the population (exactly as the US/NATO operation wasn’t warmly welcomed by all in Afghanistan), and any operation there would need to be prepared for a fight.

So, on the surface at least, there is a clear humanitarian justification for the wargames, and we shouldn’t discount it entirely.  It is certainly at least a part of the motivation of both China and Russia.

But the wargames begin to take on an entirely different, more threatening meaning when you consider that just across the sea from China is Taiwan, when you consider the menacing noises that the Chinese government and military have been making recently, and when you consider that an invasion is thought to be the most likely way that China could repossess its errant territory.

China holds similar exercises on its own fairly regularly, so an exercise of this type isn’t that much out of the ordinary for the Chinese military.  It becomes a different matter, though, because Russia is involved.  The Chinese military in particular will be hoping to get a number of tactical ideas from their Russian counterparts that they can use to enhance their chances of successfully invading Taiwan.  They’ll also be keeping a close eye on Russia’s military hardware, to see how it performs in comparison to their own.  They’ll be noting any deficiences and then deciding whether to further develop their own hardware, or to buy off the shelf from Russia.   

For Russia, the military benefits are relatively small.  They will, of course, gain from co-operation with Chinese troops, and will surely pick up a few tactical ideas.  But, let’s face it, Russia doesn’t have any particular plans to send its marines storming up a beach in the near future.  For Russia, the key practical objective here will be to promote its military hardware, with a view to increasing sales to one of its biggest customers.  Chinese observers are very unlikely to see a horde of Russian conscripts running around - instead they’ll see some of Russia’s best trained servicemen operating some of their latest high-tech weaponry. 

Geopolitical considerations are also important to this exercise, although less important than the practical Russian and Chinese aims that I’ve outlined above.  The two countries have an increasingly close, although still edgy relationship.  Any kind of operation like this allows them to develop a closer working relationship and, more importantly, gives an outward show of co-operation to the rest of the world.  This show is particularly directed at the United States.  From China’s perspective, they will want to give the impression that, should they invade Taiwan, they have at least one major ally.  Additionally, both countries will want to demonstrate that they are able to provide at least some kind of counterbalance to American dominance in the world, and that together they provide at least one of the poles of a multi-polar world.

So, what do we have?  A complex military exercise with multi-layered objectives, and a large number of justifications.  China will benefit more from the exercise than Russia and is, I think, rapidly becoming the senior partner in this relationship - although just how long Russia will be content to remain a junior partner is less sure.  There are plenty of internal tensions which will probably pull their relationship apart over time but, right now, we have a hybrid dragon-bear forcefully telling the world at large that it is a major player.

Mosnews - who else? - reports on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s barnstorming Darth Vader skit at the latest ASEAN conference party (yes, they really know how to party at these conferences):

Wearing a dark brown cape and hood (Darth Vader’s heavy breathing was difficult to create in the low-budget production), Lavrov brandished a lighted sword as he and his assistant argued about Asia to the tune of Jesus Christ Superstar.

“ASEAN, Superstar” was the refrain. “Do you think you’re what they say you are? ASEAN, ASEAN! Why we accept whatever you have done?”

Lavrov then launched into a tirade against Asia: “We’d have managed better if we’d had it planned. Why’d we chose such a remote Aseanis land?”

His commodore replied: “You didn’t do your homework, it’s ASEAN way. You are too suspicious, their motives are good.”

The skit was peppered with one-liners by Lavrov, who asked why Australia was here and got the reply: “Probably the kangaroos like Asian grass.”

Behind him a Powerpoint display showed a world map with most of the globe’s countries, including the United States, labeled as East Asia.

Darth Vader left singing with the crowd: “ASEAN, Superstar. You are the best friend of Russia.”

Class.  Pure class.

If anyone has photos or, better yet, audio of the event, let me know and I’ll post them on siberianlight.

Update: At last, a photo! (via the BBC)  Sergey Lavrov, pictured, models a rather fetching pink Vader suit.

And RIA Novosti has more on the serious political purpose behind Lavrov’s singalong:

Lavrov said the theatrical antics focused on real ASEAN problems.

"The performance was cool, political, humorous, witty and topical," the minister said, adding that the audience recorded the best jokes.

Yeah, whatever.  The man was wearing a pink Darth Vader suit and singing to the tune of Jesus Christ Superstar.  This demands total respect.

David McDuff points to what he sees as a trend towards censorship of English language translations of Russian media reports.

With the Kremlin’s increasing stranglehold on the flow of information out of Russia, it’s becoming evident that English-language versions of Russian press reports and commentaries, especially if they come from sources outside government control, are being subjected to cutting and censorship of various kinds. An example is Yulia Latynina’s recent column on the Kremlin’s "information block", which appeared in several publications,including Moscow Times.

This is most likely to be self-censorship by news organisations, rather than the heavy hand of an official censor but nonetheless, if true, this would be an extremely worrying development. 

Having said that though, while I can see good reasons why the Kremlin might want to control the flow of information out of Russia, I can’t understand why they would let the same information be published in the Russian language media.  Every English language media organisation, and every major company investing in Russia worth their salt will employ people to sift through the Russian language press as well as English language translations, so censorship of this kind is unlikely to actually stem the flow of information in any practical sense.

Today marks the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, in which 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed in cold blood by Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary units.  A Fistful of Euros has a great post on the hunt for Ratko Mladic (head of the Bosnian Serb armed forces at the time) and Radovan Karadzic (the former Bosnian Serb leader) who are both in hiding.

Now is probably a good time to note once again that Russia is also thought to be (for its own, unknown reasons) harbouring a number of Bosnian Serbs wanted by the Hague Tribunal for involvement in the Srebrenica massacre.

Andrei Terekhov and Anya Vvedenskaya have noticed that Viktor Ivanov has been opining on foreign policy. (Link in Russian). 

This is interesting, not so much because of what he is saying, but that he is saying it at all.  In his role as Presidential aide, Ivanov is not technically supposed to talk about foreign affairs:

Viktor Ivanov, one of President Vladimir Putin’s closest aides,
has become noticeably more active in foreign affairs. Ivanov visited
Luxembourg (currently chairing the European Union) on April 15, and
publicly spelled out some details about Russia’s relationship with
one of its strategic partners. Officially, Ivanov’s post does not
entitle him to make foreign policy statements; however, this former
FSB colonel-general used to be considered a curator of the Kremlin’s
CIS policy. Thus, the words of one of the Putin administration’s
most influential representatives take on special signficance in the
lead-up to a Russia-EU summit where the battle for the former Soviet
Union will be the chief intrigue.

Ivanov was given an extra opportunity to intensify his contacts
with key foreign governments by his recent appointment to the
Victory Day organizing committee, responsible for preparations for the May 9 celebrations in Moscow. All the same, some Western
observers say that Ivanov - a member of the Kremlin’s security and
law enforcement (siloviki) faction - is building up his foreign
policy experience with a view to promotion to a new post involving
participation in contact with the outside world.

Ivanov certainly appears to be someone worth watching over the next couple of years.  The article goes on to provide some more background:

Presidential aide Viktor Ivanov is responsible for human
resources policy within the Kremlin administration. He is in charge
of the presidential directorate for personnel and state awards, the presidential directorate for state service, and the presidential
directorate for ensuring constitutional rights. He is the deputy
chairman of the Victory Day organizing committee. As a veteran of
the Afghanistan war, he is a patron of war veteran organizations. He
is also responsible for the presidential commission on citizenship,
and the presidential commission for preliminary consideration of
federal court judge candidates.

This translation, originally published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, was sent to me in the Johnson’s Russia List email, and I don’t have a link to the entire article.  If I find one, I will of course, publish it.

The Guardian today claims that Russia is sheltering Bosnian war ciminals, including a number suspected of involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

The revelation has come to light after Gojko Jankovic, a Bosnian Serb, surrended himself after four years living in Moscow and the Guardian recovered a statement his wife made to the Interior Ministry of the Republika Srpska.

Her account describes a visit largely supervised by a man driving a black bulletproof Mercedes and carrying a FSB identity card. The man produced the card over dinner, but put it away when Mrs Jankovic’s interest was roused. He was "a person of knowledge and experience in police work as he spoke about tapping devices, etc", the statement said

The man paid the couple’s bills in expensive restaurants each evening of the visit, before taking them home in the early hours to a luxury flat with which Mr Jankovic had been provided.

"I was bothered by his constant presence, and then I realised that he was the one who paid the bills. I got the feeling that Gojko feels very safe in his presence," said Mrs Jankovic. According to her statement, Mr Jankovic was given Russian citizenship, under a pseudonym.

So far there has been no comment from Russia regarding these allegations.  I’m fairly certain that they’ll turn out to be true, though.  Russia has been suspected of harbouring war criminals for a while and I’m only surprised it has taken this long for evidence to come out. If the allegations really are true, the only word I think of to describe Russia’s actions is ’stupid’.

Russia is a signatory of the 1995 Dayton Agreement which brought the Bosnian civil war to an end and it voted in favour of the Security Council resolutions which set up the Tribunal and called on all states to actively support its investigations.  To be actively hiding people who are wanted by the Tribunal for war crimes is clearly a violation of commitments that Russia has made.   

Perhaps the decision was made to hide these men as a part of a general policy to frustrate the US and EU.  Perhaps the decision was made out of brotherly solidarity with Russia’s fellow Slavs.  Perhaps the decision was made in the hope that one day - after everyone else had given up hope of finding these men - Russia could claim the credit for magically ‘persuading’ the Serbs to hand them over.  Either way you look at it, the following questions have to be asked:

• Did someone in Russia not stop to think that this was going to look bad when the rest of the world discovered that Russia was hiding the very war criminals it had vowed to bring to justice. 
• Did someone in Russia not stop to think that if these men were eventually turned over the the Tribunal, someone might ask them where they’d been for the past few years?

The whole idea of harbouring war criminals seems to be indicative of a general trend in Russian foreign policy of short-sighted short-termism.  Time after time Russia is making stupid foreign policy decisions and blithely assuming that things will go well.  This wouldn’t be such a problem if there was someone in their Foreign Ministry had the ability to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.  Sadly though, there isn’t anybody in Russia with that ability and, time after time, their plans go awry. 

What’s the plural for ‘Axis of Evil’?  There seem to be plenty out there these days. 

Kommersant claims to have discovered the latest one, and it’s right on the borders of Russia.  Axis of Evil Shaping Against Moscow, screams their headline.

And who are these scary evil-doers, you ask? 

Rose-orange Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are establishing an anti-Russian tie-up to force Moscow from Caucasus and Pridnestrovie, analysts say quoted by the RBC news agency.r good measure

[The] three paties appear aggressively involved in negotiations.

The main highlights are forcing Russia from the Caucasus and
Pridnestrovie; establishment of transport corridors, going the round of
Russia. Therefore, the parties actually endeavor to create a sanitary
corridor to isolate Russia from Europe and Transcaucasia

Now this is just silly.  Of course these three countries would be more than happy to be able to establish transit corridors which circumvent Russia but, seriously, who in their right mind would call them evil? 

(Hat tip: Ultima Thule)