So, after spending the past few weeks ratcheting up the pressure, Putin has made an about turn and offered to work on a ‘joint’ missile shield with the United States.

Details of exactly how such a scheme would work are a little sketchy at the moment, to say the least, but it seems as though the Kremlin envisage a system built primarily around the radar station they currently rent in Azerbaijan.

Dmitri Peskov, Mr Putin’s spokesman, insisted that a radar base in Azerbaijan would be sufficient to cover the whole of western Europe and that the use of Poland for interceptor rockets should be reconsidered. “The two sides could completely share the technological data of that station with equal control of the station . . . It would lead to a substantial easing of tension and it will solve the problem.”

In principle, I think it’s a good idea - and, with the benefit of my 20-20 hindsight - makes Putin’s brinkmanship of the past few weeks seem much more logical. Lets face it, Russia is at much at risk of missile attack from ‘rogue’ nations or terrorist groups as Western Europe and the United States - if not more so - and a joint missile shield does seem the logical way forward.

But will it happen in practice? I can see plenty of potential problems.

For starters, there is the whole trust issue. An effective joint shield would require a lot of actual joint working, and there isn’t a lot of evidence to suggest that Russia and the US could work well together on such a politically charged project. Although, having said that, there’s always a first time for everything…

Technical issues are also going to come to the forefront. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, although welcoming Russia’s joint missile shield proposal, argued that a shield located in Azerbaijan wouldn’t be able to react in time to incoming missiles:

“It’s a bit close to the rogue states we are discussing.”

A shield located primarily in Azerbaijan wouldn’t cover all of NATO’s member states either.

I suppose this could be overcome by stationing the main radar in Azerbaijan, and the interceptor missiles somewhere else - say, in Poland - but for this would not only require phenomenal co-ordination, but would still probably require radars to be stationed too close to Russia’s Western borders. And wasn’t the whole point of Azerbaijan to avoid that…?

Ultimately, I don’t think this is anything more than a good idea, destined to failure - but I’d be happy to be proved wrong.

Update: For the true cynics among us, here another explantion as to why Putin offered to develop a joint missile shield based in Azerbaijan:

I think that the Russian base, there in Qabala [Azerbaijan] is getting ready — they’re going to lose the base, the lease on the base is going to expire, and they’ve already been making plans to relocate the radar to Krasnodar [Krai, in Russia]. And so what they’re trying to do here is legitimize their presence in Azerbaijan at the expense of the Azerbaijanis. And they will also permanently make the United States a target of the Iranians, and the Azeris, and it’s designed to divide the United States and Azerbaijan. And it creates a Russian military presence there, if I understand the statement correctly.

Cunning, or what?

Russia test fired a new ICBM yesterday.  

As you would expect, the western press - particularly in the UK - are muttering darkly about the new Cold War and a renewed arms race (see the Express and Guardian, for examples).

I was more interested by the following comment from First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov though:

“As of today Russia has new missiles that are capable of overcoming any existing or future missile defence systems. In terms of defence and security, Russia can look calmly to the country’s future.”

As Russia now has an unbeatable nuclear deterrent we can clearly expect it to stop worrying about America’s piffling missle shield defences. 

No, seriously, mark my words… from today onwards the Russian government won’t make a single complaint about the US missile defence bases in Eastern Europe.

Or maybe not.

Two British RAF Tornados were scrambled last month to intercept a two Russian Tupolev Tu-142 (Bear) bombers just off the Scottish coast last month, it has emerged. And here’s the picture to prove it:

It seems as though the Russian planes had taken a trip out to watch the Royal Navy’s recent live firing exercise, Operation Neptune Warrior, but were persuaded to turn around as the RAF Tornados flew alongside.

The British press is, rather predictably, reporting in rather gung-ho fashion, harking back to the Cold War era. The Sun quotes Squadron Leader Keith Wardlaw:

“The Russians obviously thought it might be worth having a look and taking some photos. It’s a throwback to the Cold War when they used to fly in to test our reaction times.

“It’s normal to let such aircraft know we are there by pulling up alongside and they left quietly.”

Paul Jackson, of Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft, said: “All the RAF are doing is telling them, ‘We could do this for real if we wanted to, so go and tell your mates back home.’

Paul Jackson, the editor of Jane’s Almanac brought a bit of contextual sense to the reporting, but even he couldn’t resist a bit of posturing:

“This aircraft dates back to the 1950s and although the air-frame might look dated it is still highly effective in terms of long-range maritime reconnaissance”.

“The exercise was in international waters and the Russians have got as much right to be there as we have. We do it to them, they do it to us.

“All the RAF did was to tell them, ‘We could do this for real if we wanted’.”

I’m sure the top brass over in Moscow will suffer a sleepless night tonight…

Russia is to invest more than $1 billion into nanotechnology research and development over the next three years.

Business Week reports First Deputy Prime Minister (and until recently, Defense Minister) Sergei Ivanov as saying that 90% of the benefits will be economic, while the remaining 10% will have military application:

“(Nanotechnology) is a very promising scientific and technical field, capable of fundamentally changing the model of the Russian economy … from a fuel economy to an economy of the future”.

RIA Novosti, on the other hand, has to put the story’s focus on President Putin’s comments about the military potential of the research:

“It is an area of activity in which the state is ready to invest on a grand scale. The only question is that this work should be well organized and effective, yielding practical results,” Vladimir Putin told a meeting at the Kurchatov Nuclear Research Institute in Moscow.

He said nanotechnology will lay the groundwork for new weapon systems, both offensive and defensive, adding that nanotechnology is already being used in high-tech sectors of industry, medicine, transport, space research, and telecommunications.

Russia clearly needs to catch up with the US in areas like this, both in the military and economic arenas, so it’s clearly sensible for them to invest some of the oil revenues in this area.

I’d imagine, though, that the overall amount Russia is investing is still relatively small compared to that of its competitors.

Story initially found at Nanodot, via Instapundit.

Earlier this week, a Russian Navy warship fired a shell in the direction of Ukraine:

A sailor aboard the Russian warship Tsesar Kunikov, an assault landing ship, fired a 57 millimetre artillery round in the direction of the town, for unknown reasons.

The shell landed near the village Sakharna, a suburb of Sevastopol, without causing injuries or damage.

It sounds to me like either a simple mistake, or the sailor in question had some personal “issues” he needed to work through. Either way, the Russian Navy should be embarrassed.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry are, rightly, a bit grumpy about the whole incident. A statement released yesterday reads:

The explosion could result in death of people and severe destruction in the historical site of the city. Therefore it may not be regarded as a simple regrettable incident. It is an obvious consequence of incompliance with the requirements provided in the relevant bilateral documents. Thus, the Agreement of 1997 on the status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine, particularly, the Section 2 of the Article 8, clearly defines: “The military units shall conduct exercises and other training operations within the bounds of training centers, grounds, positional and dispersal areas, shooting-ranges and (except for prohibited areas) in allotted airspace areas subject to coordination with the competent authorities”.

That’s the way to do it. Fight fire with bureaucracy.

Winds of Change reports that Russia and India are considering whether to build the next-generation MiG together.

From India’s point of view, a firm development agreement that helps finance Russia’s next-generation plane is one way to restrict Russian cooperation with China along similar lines.

Winds of Change goes on to report that India’s current fourth generation fighters are more than a match for most of their regional rivals’ air forces.

Georgia is alleging that three Russian helicopters attacked buildings in the Kodori Gorge region of Georgia.  The Kodori Gorge is the part of separatist Abkhazia under Georgian control:

“Three helicopters, preliminarily identified as Mi-24 attack gunships, flew [into the Kodori Gorge] from Russian territory or, to be precise, from the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria,” Rurua said. “They made a circle above the villages of Upper Abkhazia, and as they were making a second circle they dropped about 20 unguided rockets, or so-called NURS [Russian-made unguided] rockets.”

Nathan at Registan has more analysis:

Regardless of whether or not Russia is to blame for the incident, this situation underlines just how inappropriate it is for Russia to be involved in peacekeeping operations for the conflicts between Georgia and its separatist regions.

He goes on to note that Georgia is no angel either, and doesn’t hesitate to use the presence of Russian peacekeepers as an excuse to ratchet up tensions when it suits.

This (rather simplified) map of Russian and US forces might help to put things into perspective.

The title, by the way, reads: How Americans control Russian territory.Image from English Russia.

A spokeswoman for the Soldiers’ Mothers, Ella Polyakova, told the BBC that in St Petersburg there was “a network of clients” who would pay for sex with soldiers.

This is - unsurprisingly - coming from an anonymous source at the moment but, given the abuse scandals that regularly disgrace the Russian military, I wouldn’t be at all surprised if the claims were true.

Meanwhile, those of you with strong stomachs, English Russia has a post with diagrams of the many and varied types of abuse common in the Russian Army.

Captain’s Quarters wonders what’s behind the recent spate of nuclear ‘incidents’ that can be traced back to Russia in one way or another:

A couple of scenarios could be in play. The first is that Putin has decided to gain hard cash by putting fissile material on the black market, which is not only insane but counterproductive. After all, Putin has his own insurgencies in the Caucasus, and the material could just as easily find its way there rather that against Putin’s enemies. The second possibility is even more frightening — which is that Russia has lost control over its nuclear materials and wants to keep the West from discovering it.

I think discarding the first option is pretty easy, too.  Putin has no need of hard cash - even if he is approaching retirement, he’s got plenty of far better ways to earn some ‘under the counter’ income.  And Russia as a country isn’t exactly scrabbling around for hard cash, floating as it does on a mighty lake of black gold.

The second option is far, far more plausible and, I think, the most likely option.  Nuclear security in Russia is lax- there simply is no denying it.  Bribery and corruption is endemic, and the people guarding nuclear material are - by and large - poor.  Beyond fear, they have very little incentive to turn down a bundle of thousand rouble notes in return for looking the other way. 

A quick Google search shows that nuclear material has been going missing from Russian stores for a decade or more.  A Guardian news story shows that Chechens might have some radioactive material. 

One final option that should be considered (even though its not one I personally subscribe to) is that the Russian government is deliberately making use of its arsenal of nuclear material to further its political agenda.  This could range from trying to strike fear into the hearts of rogue operatives, to intimidation of friendly (and not so friendly states) by hinting that a dirty bomb is a possibility, to simply trying to persuade Western donors to pay for the cleanup, disposal or security of nuclear material. 

The Jamestown Foundation notes that Defense Ministry tanks, under the command of the FSB, fired on Beslan School number one, as the school was being stormed. The revelation was made during the trial of Nurpashi Kulaev, the sole surviving hostage taker.

I have to say, I’m not actually all that surprised at this news. Storming a building of that size when you don’t know exactly what is inside is likely to require some pretty heavy duty firepower. Even though schoolchildren were inside, the military on the ground would have calculated that the risk that children would be hurt by tank fire was outweighed by the need to get into the building as quickly as possible in order to save as many lives as possible.

What did surprise me, though, was this:

Kindeyev said that the tanks were handed over to the FSB’s command because no one from the Defense Ministry, including the Defense Minister himself, has the right to order a tank to fire.

My understanding of just who has responsibility for what in Russia’s maze like security structures is pretty hazy, but I find it more than a little odd that the Defense Ministry has tanks, but doesn’t have the right to order them to fire. Can anybody out there with a better knowledge of the military help me out?

Pavel Felgenhauer’s regular Defense Dossier column wasn’t published in the Moscow Times this week. By the looks of things, his views on the Nalchik raid were considered unacceptable to the editor, who rejected it.

Felgenhauer sees conspiracy, both in Nalchik, and at the Moscow Times, and has sent his version of events to Johnson’s Russia List:

Berry decided not to publish my regular column this week that was filed Sunday and was about the tragedy in Nalchik, but the story is, I believe, more important than a simple clash of opinion between editor and columnist.

Today there is mounting evidence from eyewitnesses in Nalchik that the rebel attack or uprising on Oct. 13 was followed by a rampage by security forces, by random revenge killings, ethnically and religiously motivated murder of suspects from the minority Balkar tribe by the local police force that is predominately Kabardin. Eyewitnesses (I met and had contact with some) that are in no way connected with the rebels ethnically or religiously, not only report horrific stories of indiscriminate killings, a massacre, but also say that the number of dead in Nalchik is several times higher than officially reported and that there are over 300 corpses in the local morgue.

There is a cover-up of the alleged massacre in Nalchik that is run by the Russian state propaganda machine and it seems that The Moscow Times has succumb to becoming part of this cover-up. Not only have they rejected my column, which could have been a coincidence, but also their reporting of events in Nalchik is a copy-story of government propaganda.

You can find his full, and unedited column at the Johnson’s Russia List site, but here’s a brief excerpt, so you can see what all the fuss is about:

Small groups of rebels of 3 to 10 men simultaneously attacked police stations and other military targets (9 locations in all) in Nalchik last Thursday at 9 am. Most of the engagements lasted about an hour, and then the rebels melted away before Russian reinforcements could enter the city. Security forces and army units began putting up roadblocks around Nalchik long after most of the action was over and these pickets did not cover the entire perimeter of the city. Three small groups of rebels (less than 20 men, most of them wounded) were stranded in Nalchik and were killed by Special Forces the next day.

But the official body count raises many questions. The history of contemporary urban anti-guerrilla engagements by Russian forces in the Caucasus, Americans in Iraq and so on, indicates that dislodging, killing or capturing over a hundred determined fighters, holed up within a big modern city requires much effort, a week or so of action and lots of tanks, heavy guns and attack aircraft support. The casualty list, the duration of the fight and it’s intensify in Nalchik do not match do not match each other.

Information has been coming out of Nalchik that many families are reporting that young men are missing without explanation. It would seem that after the original rebel force mostly melted away, the security forces began revenge attacks against the population, kidnapping and killing suspects more or less at random. This may explain the abnormally large number of “terrorists” killed. Local security officials could have used the occasion to settle old scores with suspected “Wahhabis,” while the large number of dead “terrorists” pleased the Kremlin and allowed it to declare victory.

By the looks of things, Felgenhauer is basing his analysis largely on his belief that the numbers quoted do not add up to what one would expect in such a battle. However, I’m not so sure he’s right in this case. Felgenhauer argues that it is difficult to dislodge “holed up” fighters, and in this assertion he is correct. However, by all accounts so far, most of the attackers involved in the raid on Nalchik didn’t manage to hole themselves up anywhere. Other than the 20 or so men stranded in Nalchik overnight, and killed the next day, it looks like all of the other attacks were repulsed by entrenched (or “holed up” perhaps?) Russian soldiers. (Note: I don’t mean entrenched in the sense that they were necessarily expecting an attack and well prepared - I mean this in the sense that they were physically in the buildings under attack, and all things being equal, would usually be expected to successfully defend their position.

I have a great deal of respsect for Pavel Felgenhauer, and I usually find his analyses spot on. He is generally anti-government in his stance, although in my experience, usually also willing to give credit to the government when it is due, and for him to write a column on Nalchik which is critical of the Russian government is not surprising. But, this time, I think he has probably stepped over the line, by giving credence to rumours that are almost entirely unsupported by evidence. Not only does his basic hypothesis not stand up to even my simple scrutiny, but I can’t seem to find any other evidence to support his claim from what I would consider a reputable source.

The Russian media could, I suppose be colluding to keep news of a massacre from reaching the outside world, but I can’t imagine that every other credible news organisation in the world would fail to spot this, or at least to spot the rumours flying around and do some investigating of their own.

[Thanks to David from A Step at a Time, for the link to the Felgenhauer article]

For China and India to become involved in a joint military exercise with Russia is a pretty far-fetched idea at the moment, I’d say,, but Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, in India to observe a joint Russian-Indian military exercise, has been busy talking up the idea.

Russian-Indian-Chinese military exercises could be held in the future under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Interfax reported Sunday quoting the Defense Minister.

“In principle, this is possible. We’ve held military exercises and there is nothing unusual in this,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told journalists in Delhi on Sunday.

“The SCO [Shanghai Co-operation Organisation] was formed as an organization to deal with security issues and measures to ensure security,” he said.

[…]“While joining the SCO as an observer India was guided by its national interests. If this is so, India is drawn to this organization by the main aspects of its work, security being its central aspect,” the Russian defense minister said.

True, relations between the China and India have been gradually improving over the last decade or so, but they’ve been rising from a ridiculously low level, and have certainly not risen so much that they would wish to advertise their growing friendship by holding a joint military exercise - even if Russia is involved to make it look more multinational.

I think this is largely wishful thinking on the Russian part, an attempt to draw India further into the SCO - it currently only has observer status - in an attempt to balance the influence of China. The suggestion really does little more than show the Russia feels it is in a weak position in the SCO and feels that adding in a third large power would dampen somewhat the influence that China has in Central Asia.

[By the way, I’ve chosen this Mosnews article to highlight the story, as it is one of the laziest pieces of reporting I’ve seen for quite a while. You’ll note that they quote an Interfax article, and I guess that it is ok in a sense to quote quite extensively from them. But, in this piece, Mosnews have lifted the entire text of two Interfax articles (here, and here)and reprinted them almost verbatim. The only extra value they’ve added is two paragraphs at the end giving a little context (which I’d imagine they’ve lifted from another earlier article). Based on this evidence, they’re even worse than bloggers - at least we usually only excerpt sections of an article, and we tend to give back at least a little added value in terms of anaysis. OK, Sunday morning rant over, and now back to your normal scheduled programming.]

Last week I wrote about the disgraceful number of closed cities in Russia, another of those leftovers from an anarchic age that Russia remains addicted to, despite (or perhaps because of) the restrictions it places on the human rights of their 1.7 million residents.

In a rather timely decision, the BBC have just decided to publish a feature article about the Russian cosmodrome at Plesetsk. Now, Plesetsk isn’t a closed city, but Mirny, the town next door is. The BBC reporter managed to get a precious invitation to visit Mirny, and this is what he saw:

Home to about 80,000 military staff and their families, at first glance, it seems like any other town, save the austere apartment blocks and lack of road signs.

We are taken to the space museum in the town square, then the kindergarten, where children dressed in traditional clothes sing Russian songs.

Despite the presence of occasional teams of foreign engineers, most of the town remains off limits to visitors. They can walk around only a small central section and must not stray outside the designated area.

The town was never on the map and its inhabitants can still only be officially reached under a military field post number.

I’ve just been to see if I could find Mirny using both GoogleEarth (the satellite imaging programme) and Expedia maps. I tried every spelling of the name I could think of without any luck (although I did discover there is a village with the same name in Southern Russia). I think I’ll have to investigate further, to see whether any of the closed cities that the Russian government has admitted to (and Mirny isn’t one of them) are on any maps.

So far, the only other account I’ve been able to find about a visit to a closed city, is Tajikblog’s visit to Taboshar, the city where the uranium for the first Soviet nuclear bombs was mined. Taboshar - in Tajikistan, by the way, and not Russia - is no longer a closed city. But it certainly doesn’t seem a very welcoming place…

Either way, we just slowly begin to explore the town. It’s really quite a nice town with birch trees and huge stone houses lining the streets, aside from the fact that most of the buildings are empty and starting to fall apart. Soon enough, though, another set of suspicious men appears (with their wives and children in tow, not exactly an intimidating sight) and the confrontation begins.

The mayor (who prior to this had a good reputation among internationals) was at the center of the posse. I wanted to meet him anyway hoping for a tour, so this was as fine a time as any to say hello. I must have caught him at a bad time, though, as his mood was sour.

After the initial “hi I’m Peter XXX, photographer from New York” schtick, it was time for the inquisition.
Why are you here? Who guided you here? What do you know about this town? Etc. etc.
Nargiza steadfastly translates the questions and my answers, but suddenly his suspicion and temper rise.

One thing that set him off, I think was my knowledge of the town’s having a high-tech science lab. Stephanie told me about it as the mayor’s sad attempt to attract people to his town, to create a center for technology. Maybe something else is going on, because he certainly didn’t want to speak about it.

I’m going to keep searching for stories about Russian closed cities (and others around the Former Soviet Union if I can find them). If you have any links, or stories of your own, please feel free to share them here.

Following the loss of a European Space Agency satellite - Cryosat - that was designed to map polar ice, the Russian Space Agency has suspended all flights using the Rokot booster system.

The rocket’s second stage failed to separate following the launch and the Cryosat satellite fell into the Arctic Ocean, Russian and European officials said. The second stage did not separate apparently because a missing command from the onboard flight control system caused the main engine to continue to operate after it should have cut off, burning all the fuel on board, the European Space Agency said in a statement on its Web site.

Mosnews also reports the failure of another, experimental, Russian rocket system:

Demonstrator was launched on Oct. 7 from the nuclear-powered submarine Borisoglebsk in the northern Barents Sea. It was first reported that it had safely landed in the Kura test range on Russia’s Far East Kamchatka Peninsula but the Russian military were unable to determine the landing location and later said they had lost the vehicle.

This was the fourth test of Demonstrator, with the previous attempts also failing due to various problems in the launch stages or landing.

As Mosnews goes on to report, the failures are not doing much for the Russian space agency’s image around the world:

It also hurt the Russians, who have been aggressively trying to move into the commercial satellite launch business.

Although, having said that, just who is competing with Russia in the commercial satellite business these days?

One final piece of space news, while I’m rounding things up - RIA Novosti reports that Russia is to withdraw 2,800 troops from its launch facility in Baikonur, Kazakhstan over the next couple of years.

“If [military] launches occur once in four-five months, we do not need so many people,” Ivanov said. “We have excessive troops there.”Plesetsk (the northern part of European Russia) will gradually become the main military launching site of the Russian Defense Ministry but will also see some civil launches, he added.

It’s not often you hear of Russia voluntarily withdrawing troops from Central Asia, and I’d imagine the Kazakh government are secretly thrilled by the announcement, even if it does indicate that Baikonur is no longer the cash cow it once was.

(For more on Plesetsk, by the way, see the next post. It’s located just a few miles from a closed city).